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TIME AND PROPERTY IN THE AMERICAN
REPUBLICAN LEGAL CULTURE
GREGORY S. ALEXANDER*
Modern historiansincludingJG.A. Pocock and Gordon Wood have demonstratedthe
degree to which revolutionaryAmericanpoliticaldiscourse incorporated"civic republican" notions of virtue, property, and citizenship that promoted stable land ownership
and active politicalparticipation. These historians also have argued that the republican view soon gave way to the now-dominant liberalview that champions the alienability ofproperty andprivate overpublic life ProfessorAlexander argues that this history
istoo neat In fact, American republicanismcontainedunreconciled "dialectical"tensions-between individual rights and societalgoals, stability of ownership and wealth
redistribution,historicalcontinuity and change-tha4 though now expressed in a different vocabulary,continue to plagueAmerican politicalthought Focusingon the concept of property as it appeared in the thoughts of Jefferson, Adams, Madison,
Hamilton,and Webster, ProfessorAlexander details the ways in which these otherwise
diverse thinkers attempted to confront and reconcile a common set of dialectical
concerns
INTRODUCTION

From the nation's beginning until the present, American legal discourse about property has been dialectical. That is, at any given mo-

ment, the concept of property has contained elements that conflict with,
if not contradict, one another. To understand different periods' concepts

of property as dialectical is to treat them as conceptual responses to historical predicaments that members of particular cultures define for their
own culture. At the deepest level, these predicaments consist of antinomies-for example, between society and individual, stability and
change-with which political discourse wrestles. Accordingly, the con* Professor of Law, Cornell University. B.A., 1970, University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign; J.D., 1973, Northwestern University. I am grateful to Theodore Eisenberg, Alan
Freeman, Hendrik Hartog, Paul Hyams, Alfred S. Konefsky, Isaac Kramnick, Elizabeth
Mensch, Frank Michelman, Carol Rose, Robert Steinfeld, and participants in the faculty
workshops at Cornell and SUNY-Buffalo law schools for their comments and suggestions on a
prior draft of this Article.
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cepts that members of a culture develop to understand and cope with
these predicaments contain antinomic elements. Thus, in American history, proponents of particular views about political issues (for example,
how property ought to be distributed) are forced to attempt to reconcile
these fundamental tensions. Moreover, different dialectics have organized American legal writing about property during different periods of
American history. The result is an American legal discourse that has
created multiple legal meanings of property rather than one fixed
1
meaning.
This Article interprets the legal meanings of property that were created during one of these periods, from roughly 1765 to 1800. Historians
have described this period as the high point of the American recrudescence of the classical republican tradition of political thought. That tradition emphasized (as distinguished from classical liberal thought) the
ideal of a citizenry devoted less to private-gain than to political participation in pursuit of the public good. Property, on this view, was valued
insofar as its distribution aided the citizenry in the free pursuit of that
good. This Article's analysis treats American legal discourse about property during this period as a rich and complex political, philosophical, and
legal conversation in which the participants attempted to work out,
within a shared conceptual vocabulary, the dialectical elements of their
understanding of property.
To begin to understand the complexity of this historical terrain requires a departure from the two interpretive frameworks that have dominated much intellectual and legal historiography, that is, the
I These legal understandings of property, of course, were not the only public meanings of
property that existed in American society during the republican period. Indeed, they were not
the only political-legal meanings. Isaac Kramnick has identified, for example, the existence of
four distinguishable political languages during the constitutional period: republicanism, Lockean liberalism, work-ethic Protestantism, and state-centered theories of power and sovereignty.
See I. Kramnick, Republicanism and Bourgeois Liberalism: Political Ideology in Late Eighteenth-Century England and America 260-88 (1990). Although Kramnick does not do so, a
distinct understanding of property can be identified in each of these languages. Moreover,
apart from the meanings of property emerging from legal or mandarin political discourses,
different social groups historically engage in their own dialogues that create alternative public
meanings of ownership and property. See, e.g., L. Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism 49-56
(1988) (discussing "country-republican" ideology of upland South Carolinians during antebellum period); S. Lebsock, The Free Women of Petersburg: Status and Culture in a Southern
Town, 1784-1860, at 112-45 (1984) (describing differences between men's and single women's
understandings of property in one Virginia community).
The meanings created by the legal writers whose texts are examined in this Article were
elite in the sense that the participants in this dialogue represented an elite, powerful segment of
American society. Precisely because they were powerful, however, their dialogue played an
important role in the construction of social knowledge that dominated the last part of the
eighteenth century.
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"evolutionary" and "transformational" frameworks. 2 In recent years,
American intellectual historians have favored the transformational
framework and have used it to characterize some particular historical
moment, such as 1787, 3 or the early Federal period, 4 or even the War of

1812, 5 as the moment at which American political and legal thought repudiated civic ideology in favor of liberalism.6 This tendency to see the
early history of the republic in terms of a dramatic shift from one neat
and coherent world-view to another reached its extreme in the works of
those historians who interpreted Federalist ideology as monolithic and

antirepublican, thereby reducing "Federalist" to "Liberal" and "AntiFederalist" to "Republican." '7 The problem with this interpretive frame2 These labels are my own. Until recently, the "evolutionary" framework has been the
historiographical orthodoxy in legal scholarship. For a lucid discussion of this framework, see
Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 57 (1984). Its counter-framework, the
"transformational" model of legal history, has become a kind of neoorthodoxy in recent years.
See, e.g., M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (1977).
These frameworks differ over their treatment of historical change. The evolutionary
framework, which has several variations, understands legal change in both legal thought and
legal doctrine as occurring incrementally. See Gordon, supra, at 63-65. It acknowledges
change but denies, or at least minimizes, discontinuity. The transformational framework, by
contrast, emphasizes discontinuities in legal theories and practices. See M. Horwitz, supra, at
31-62. On this view, legal change occurs through major breaks with past modes of thought or
doctrinal practices. Focusing on the dialectical character of American legal discourse (a term
which is intended here to break down the categorical distinction between thought and practice)
permits one to embrace both continuity and discontinuity as historiographical themes.
3 See G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at viii (1969) (identifying 1787-1797 as period marking rejection of civic tradition in American political discourse
in favor of liberalism). For an application of Wood's interpretive framework and periodization
to the question of property in American law, see Note, The Origins and Original Significance
of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale L.J. 694 (1985).
4 See L. Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology 246-70
(1978) (evolution of political ideology and conception of checks and balances in government
during 1790s); F. McDonald, The Presidency of Thomas Jefferson 19-20, 161-63 (1976)
(same); J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the
Atlantic Republican Tradition 506-45 (1975) (conception of political virtue in 1790s).
5 See S. Watts, The Republic Reborn: War and the Making of Liberal America, 17901820, at 59-62 (1987) (dating shift from civic republicanism to liberalism and capitalism to
War of 1812).
6 Basically, civic republicanism is the political ideology that emphasizes citizen deliberation and participation in pursuit of the common good. The term "liberalism" is used to refer
to the political tradition that is skeptical of the notion of the common good and that insists on
the primacy of the rights of the individual to define and pursue her own conception of good
compatible with the rights of others to do the same. Although some historians have pointed to
the liberal elements of Jefferson's thought, see, e.g., Appleby, What is Still American in the
Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson?, 39 Win. & Mary Q. 287 (1982), for reasons that
will become clear later in this Article, I believe that Jefferson's republican credentials are
unimpeachable.
7 See Note, supra note 3, at 694 nn.1-2; cf. Kramnick, The "Great National Discussion":
The Discourse of Politics in 1787, 45 Win. & Mary Q. 3, 12 (1988) (Although a "case can be
made for the Federalists as liberal modernists and the Antifederalists as nostalgic republican
communitarians seeking desperately to hold on to a virtuous moral order threatened by corn-
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work is that it "romanticizes" republicanism, by which I mean to suggest
two related sins. First, the transformational view, by compartmentalizing liberalism versus republicanism, implicitly portrays each camp as a
regimented and ordered whole. In the case of republicanism, this distorts the complex meaning of crucial concepts in the late eighteenth-century American political-legal dialogue, including concepts of property.
It overlooks the similarities between supposed opposites and the discontinuities between supposed lines of descent. It also misses the great degree
of ambiguity in prevailing ideologies and their vocabularies. Finally, this
view ignores the interdependency between "republican" and "liberal"
lines of argument. We will better understand the changes that occurred
between the eve of the Revolution and the close of the eighteenth century
if we self-consciously emphasize both disjunction and continuity---dissent and descent-from the Jeffersonian culture and its concepts. A
framework that seeks to identify historical dialectics permits us to do just
that.
The dialectical framework recognizes that eighteenth-century civicrepublican American lawyers saw themselves as confronting a predicament involving the effect of time and history, time's social aspect, on
property. Virtually all of their writings connected property with different
conceptions of time and history.8 This convergence between temporalhistorical ideas and ideas about property in turn generated a dialectic
between themes of stability and dynamism. This dialectic touched on a
wide variety of questions, including the proper distribution of wealth, the
alienability of land, and the desirability of different forms of property.
Rediscovering the dialectical complexities of republicanism will help
save it from the second aspect of its romanticization, namely, its perceived obsolescence in the face of the "triumph" of liberalism and the
market-economy view of property solely as a commodity for exchange.
Of course, modernist and postmodernist legal writers might find it odd
that anyone would identify time as a central puzzle of property. From
their perspective, the core predicament is the relationship between the
self and others. 9 This is because both modernist and postmodernist writmerce and market society... [, a]n equally strong case can be made for the Federalists as
republican theorists[, which illustrates] the overlapping of political languages... in 1787.").
8 For a general discussion of time as a dominant theme in eighteenth-century American
thought, see M. Lienesch, New Order of the Ages: Time, the Constitution, and the Making of
Modem American Political Thought (1988).
9 This is hardly to say that eighteenth-century Americans were oblivious to this problem.
J.E. Crowley has argued convincingly that the relationship between self and society was an
important problem to eighteenth-century Americans. See J. Crowley, This Sheba, Self: The
Conceptualization of Economic Life in Eighteenth-Century America (1974). Their concern
with this problem is evident from their preoccupation with moral personality and the effect of
commerce and wealth on it. As is discussed throughout this Article, republicans were preoc-
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ers have defined the fundamental predicament of property in terms of a
dialectic of sociality, an oscillation between visions of the self as separated from and in union with others.10 They have pointed out that while
the liberal vision underlying individual property rights depicts the self as
separated from politics, it is politics that defines the personal sphereindividual property rights depend on state power. Moreover, property is
inescapably relational. When the state recognizes and enforces one person's property right, it simultaneously denies property rights in others.
Thus the owner's security as to particular assets comes at the expense of
others being vulnerable to the owner's control over those assets. Ownership is power over persons, not merely things.
Yet, although seemingly unrelated, the republican and the modemist predicaments are in fact related. Examining the former will inform
our understanding of the latter. The eighteenth-century dialectic of temporality articulated the premodern legal and political cultures' anxiety
about the role of property in a very different culture-one that I will call
modem. The modem culture, characterized by an instrumental and selfaggrandizing conception of rationality, by an understanding of the market mode of economic organization, and by a legal conception of property ownership that secures the autonomy of individually defined goods,
did not emerge fully until the second half of the nineteenth century, but
its seeds were sown much earlier."1 More specifically, the dialectic of
temporality was the premodem cultural formulation of a dilemma that
modems have articulated as the dialectic between individuality and sociality. Stability represented adherence to shared traditions and a sense of
one's place in the social order. Dynamism represented individual capacity to break free of stifling social conventions and entrenched hierarchies.
Stability and dynamism, tradition and fluidity, embeddedness and
uniqueness: though differently articulated, these sets of antinomies reflect cultural anxiety that we can now see as linked together.
The two dialectics overlap in another sense as well. They arise from
the same historical phenomenon, namely, the transformation of property
cupied with the question of whether individuals were capable of acting in a public-regarding
fashion.
10 See, e.g., Alexander, The Dead Hand in the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37
Stan. L. Rev. 1189 (1985); Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q. 8 (1927); Hale,
Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470 (1923);
Mensch, The Colonial Origins of Liberal Property Rights, 31 Buffalo L. Rev. 635 (1982);
Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, 30 Representations 162 (1990); Radin, The
Liberal Conception of Property: Crosscurrents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 Colum. L.
Rev. 1667 (1988); Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 611 (1988); F.
Michelman, Republican Property (1989) (unpublished manuscript); W. Simon, Social-Republican Property (1991) (unpublished manuscript).
11See M. Horwitz, supra note 2, at 33-34, 101-08 (discussing how common law of property
changed in mid-18th century to an instrumental vision of economic development).
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from a nonfungible, necessary good into a readily exchangeable commodity. Many modem liberal theorists favor this development. They argue
that freely transferable property promotes both individual freedom and
wealth-creation. 12 Their critics, though, point out the double-edged nature of the legal term "alienation": that property relations in which market actors treat each other instrumentally for personal gain are detached
and distorted. 13 Late eighteenth-century American legal writers similarly were ambivalent about the commodification of property, but they
expressed their ambivalence through the dialectic of stable and dynamic
property. Examining this earlier dialogue as an alternative set of metaphors for the social predicament of property provides a deeper understanding of why the meaning of property remains so controversial today.
Neither the use of dialectic as a methodology nor the emphasis on
time constitutes a novel approach to interpreting republican thought.
J.G.A. Pocock, to whom any scholar of republicanism owes a large debt,
repeatedly stresses the dialectical character of what he calls the
republican tradition throughout that tradition's several incarnations, in
Renaissance Florence, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England, and
revolutionary America. Pocock's work also focuses on the crucial problem that time has created for the republican ideology 14 Nevertheless,
this Article departs from Pocock's work in two important respects: one
12 See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1111-15 (1972); Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 970, 971-72 (1985); cf. Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 931 (1985) (favoring inalienability of some types of
property on public-policy grounds).
13 See, e.g., Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 1852-55, 1870-97 (1987)
(arguing that market-inalienabilities should be evaluated on concept of human flourishing
other than universal commodification); see text accompanying notes 74-79 infra.
On related aspects of the modem dilemma of market property, see note 78 infra.
14 Time was not uniquely problematic for republican writers. It was problematic for
American common lawyers generally. American acceptance of the English common law of
property in the face of a political and ideological revolution against England, as is discussed
later, see text accompanying notes 113-55 infra, posed the question of the static or dynamic
character of common law property. This was a problem generally with the role of the common
law in postrevolutionary American law. As G. Edward White points out, "Their [federal
judges'] problems were basically those of all early-nineteenth-century Americans who perceived a need to preserve the special character of American culture in light of an increased
distance between the Revolutionary experience and the present. Their concern... was the
same concern exhibited by other interpreters of their time: how to invest the past with meaning for the present and future, and thereby preserve the exceptional version of American republicanism against decay, while modifying it to accommodate social and economic change."
3-4 G. White, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: The Marshall Court and
Cultural Change, 1815-35, at 8 (1988). This Article departs from Professor White's interpretation in two respects: first, it dates the emergence of this temporal predicament within the
revolutionary era itself, second, its understanding of culture is not limited to social and economic circumstances but stresses ideology as well.
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methodological, the other substantive. First, unlike Pocock,15 this Article does not claim that the dialectical framework constitutes a neutral
recovery of the actual thoughts or objective reconstruction of the speech
practices of individuals from the past. The dialectic framework seems
useful to me because it facilitates the resituation of the discourse of
American legal writers from the past into the present legal culture, in
which the predicament of marketable property is understood dialectically. Rather than stepping outside the present context to reconstruct
the thoughts of the dead within their own, what intellectual historians
can hope to accomplish is "anachronistically [to] impose enough of our
problems and vocabulary on the dead to make them conversational
16
partners."
Second, Pocock sees no connection between the premodern dialectic
of temporality and the modem dialectic of sociality. He ignores the dilemma that property, especially commodified property, continues to pose
for the conception of the self, as separated from and simultaneously connected with others. By contrast, my study interprets the eighteenth-century temporality dialectic as a metaphor for the modem sociality
dilemma.
15 Pocock's approach to intellectual history aims at recovering and explaining authorial
intention. His answer to the problem of the hermeneutic circle is to finesse it: he states that
the historian "is characteristically interested in the performance of agents other than himself
and does not desire to be the author of his own past so much as to uncover the doings of other
authors in and of it." J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History 9 (1985). The end result
of this focus on subjective intentions of autonomous individuals, Pocock claims, is that the
historian's politics are inherently liberal. Id.
16 Rorty, The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres, in Philosophy in History 49, 49
(R. Rorty, J. Schneewind & Q. Skinner eds. 1984).
This is not the place for an extended discussion of my methodological differences with
Pocock. Recognizing, however, that my statement regarding the aim of intellectual historyto see how the discourse of the past can speak to the predicament of the present-makes me
guilty of the mortal sin of "presentism," I will summarily state two defenses here.
First, the historiographical claims of "radical contextualist" intellectual historians like
Pocock and Quentin Skinner are themselves highly vulnerable to a number of basic epistemological objections. For example, critics have called into question not only the recoverability of
authorial intentions but the theory of language (language as representational) and the relationship among author, text, and reader (text as passive facilitator of communion between author
and reader) that the contextualists assume. My own views are closest to Gadamer's hermeneutics. See H. Gadamer, Truth and Method 267-74 (1985).
My second defense is political rather than epistemological. In practicing "presentist" history, I am affirming the Jeffersonian idea, discussed in Part IIinfra, that each generation, or in
my terms, each culture, is primarily responsible to itself rather than to the past. To impose our
vocabulary and our dilemmas on past discourses is to act upon that responsibility. It is also an
act of self-expression and self-creation. In that sense this Article itself constitutes a republican
act. For a clear discussion of the historiographical controversy between contextualists and
their critics, see Harlan, Intellectual History and the Return of Literature, 94 Am. Hist. Rev.
581 (1989). For a useful overview of contextualism, focusing on perhaps its most important
figure, see Tully, The Pen Is a Mighty Sword: Quentin Skinner's Analysis of Politics, in Meaning & Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics 7 (J.Tully ed. 1988).
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This Article's argument proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the
broader intellectual background of civic republicanism. Part II provides
a glimpse of the republican dialectic of time and property, using Jefferson's discussion of the idea that the earth belongs to the living as an
exemplar, while Part III focuses on the various complexities of the republican idea of property. Part IV is the core of the Article. It examines
in depth the interrelated historical dialectics through which Jefferson and
other American republican legal writers tried to create coherent meanings of property for the new nation. Part V is a prolonged coda, describing the redefinitions of the civic understanding of property in the
constitutional and postconstitutional period.
I
THE INTELLECTUAL UNIVERSE OF

Civic

REPUBLICANISM

"Republicanism," as Gordon Wood explained, "meant more for
Americans [of the revolutionary generation] than simply the elimination
of a king and the institution of an elective system."' 17 The core of American republican thought during the eighteenth century was the idea that
private "interests" both could and should be subordinated to the common welfare of the polity. This idea, which originated in classical Greek
political writing, particularly that of Aristotle, and underwent periodic
revivals and modifications in Renaissance Florence and in seventeenthcentury England,"' animated nearly all political and legal writing
throughout the period of the Revolution and even after. As Wood further explained, "[b]y 1776 the Revolution came to represent a final attempt.., by many Americans to realize the traditional Commonwealth
ideal of a corporate society, in which the common good would be the
only objective of government." 1 9
What made the notion of the public good as the central objective of
political life intelligible was a conception of society as a homogenous
body whose members were organically linked together. The common
good, then, was not merely what the consensus of society's individual
members wished, but a substantive conception of the moral good that
transcended individual interests. 20 Such a holistic understanding of society did not exclude the concept of individual liberty, but it did at least
require a public conception of liberty. A central dilemma of American
politics was not thought to be protecting individual freedoms against collective encroachment, but protecting the political rights of ordinary citi17
18
19
20

G. Wood, supra note 3, at 47.
See generally J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 4.
G. Wood, supra note 3, at 54.

See id. at 65-70.
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zens against aristocratic privileges and power. Protecting the political
liberty of the people would serve to protect their individual liberties.
According to American republicanism, the realization of this ideal
required a particular moral character among the citizenry. 2 1 Citizens
had to practice "virtue," or a willingness to subordinate their individual
wants for the well-being of the entire polity. American republicans were
well aware of how extraordinary this demand on individuals was and
how fragile the requirement of virtue made the republic. 22 Virtue was
understood as constantly threatened by "corruption." Indeed, eighteenth-century American republican discourse was preoccupied with a dialectic between "virtue" and "corruption." Political writing was
preoccupied with both the sources of corruption and the social, economic, and political conditions necessary to overcome it. In short, the
civic-republican ideology posited that virtue, public and private, required
the existence of certain social conditions. Jefferson, as the leading exponent of republicanism, articulated this "sociology of virtue" 23 by means
of an opposition between the "aristocracy of wealth" and the "aristocracy of virtue and talent." 24 That dichotomy was a trope that was in
turn part of a cluster of oppositions that characterized the political
problems and solutions identified in civic-republican discourse. The
most important of these tropic oppositions included:
virtue vs. corruption;
equality vs. privilege;
leisure vs. luxury;
independence vs. servility;
liberty vs. wealth.
Property occupied a central place in this typology. Its role, however, was
neither straightforward nor strictly instrumental. Rather, it was dialectical and symbolic.
II
THE REPUBLICAN DILEMMA STATED: JEFFERSON'S
DocTRINE OF POLITICAL RELATIVISM

In September of 1789, Thomas Jefferson, then serving as ambassador to France, drafted a letter to James Madison setting forth a political
and legal doctrine remarkable for its boldness and for its simplicity. 25
21
22
23
24

See id.
See id. at 91-93.
J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 4, at 545-46.
See T. Jefferson, Autobiography, in 1 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 1 (P. Ford ed.

1904).

25 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), reprinted in 15 The
Papers of Thomas Jefferson 392 (J. Boyd ed. 1958) [hereinafter Jefferson Papers].
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"The question," Jefferson began, "[w]hether one generation of men has a
right to bind another, seems never to have been stated either on this or
our side of the water. Yet it is a question of such consequences as not
only to merit decision, but place also, among the fundamental principles
of every government. '2 6 Turning directly to the answer to this "fundamental" question, Jefferson continued, "I set out on this ground, which I
suppose to be self evident, 'that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living': that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it."27
This is the famous doctrine of "political relativism." At one level
the doctrine is an answer, albeit a remarkable answer, to an aspect of a
larger question of intergenerational justice familiar to modem political
theorists and lawyers: what rights and duties, if any, do generations owe
to each other?28 Jefferson's rather unique answer asserted a dynamic
principle of political economy: that each generation is free to create its
own social order and is under no constraints from actions taken by past
generations. This was a severe restriction on, indeed a denial of, the possibility of transmitting ideas between generations. Jefferson went so far
as to suggest that every constitution and every law naturally expires and
must be either reenacted or revised at the end of nineteen years, which
was, by his calculation, the life expectancy of any single generation.
At a deeper level, Jefferson's letter was an attempt to define for the
republican legal and political culture the relationship between property
and society. He unambiguously asserted that, while the general principle
that the earth belongs to the living is grounded in the laws of nature and
therefore is by definition presocial and prepolitical, specific property
rights are strictly social creations. So, upon the death of the owner of
land, "the child, the legatee, or the creditor takes it, not by any natural
right, but by the law of a society of which they are members, and to
which they are subject." 29
This assertion, that society creates property rights and ought continually to control them, separated Jefferson's doctrine from the tradition of
thought regarding the origin and character of property rights that is
commonly called Lockean. 30 The very idea of property rights being usuId.
Id.
28 See, e.g., J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 284-93 (1971) (considering relations between
present and future generations rather than present and past generations).
29 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), reprinted in 15 Jefferson Papers, supra note 25, at 392.
30 Locke's own theory placed the origins of contemporary property rights in both nature
and social convention. In this sense, as Richard Schlatter observed, Locke himself was not
always Lockean. See R. Schlatter, Private Property: The History of an Idea 152, 157-61
(1973).
26
27
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fructuary, a term borrowed from Roman law, 3 1 placed a considerable
distance between the Jeffersonian and the Lockean conceptions of prop32
erty. Usufructuary interests, conferring only a lifetime right to use,
confer none of the individual sovereignty over resources that fee simple
ownership is thought to do in the Lockean tradition. Such a notion of
ownership presupposes that individual rights are social rather than presocial or "natural."
The conception of property embedded in Jefferson's doctrine not
only asserts the social character of property rights but their political
character as well. For property was valued not as an end in itself but as a
foundation for republican government. Each generation had to be free to
redefine property because the specific configuration of property rights depended upon the political demands of the republic and the maintenance
of virtue.
The doctrine that the earth belongs to the living, then, represented
an attempt to create a public meaning for property in the new nation in
terms of time. It depicted, figuratively through the use of naturalistic
metaphor, American property, or more precisely, civic-republican Amer34
ican property, 3 3 as freed from the past; dynamic, rather than static.
But defining the meaning of republican American property in those
terms prompts a series of questions about our relationship to the past
that Jefferson did not answer. 35 If people were, as the doctrine suggests,
31 See B. Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law 110-11 (1962).
32 See F. Lawson & B. Rudden, The Law of Property 163-64 (2d ed. 1982).
33 See note 6 supra (discussing civic republicanism).
34 My interpretation of Jefferson and the Jeffersonian meaning of property differs from that
developed by Professor Joyce Appleby. See Appleby, supra note 6, at 287. She interprets
Jefferson's generational egalitarianism as repudiating the civic-republican tradition. Because
Appleby so strongly associates the civic tradition with political elitism, represented by figures
like Montesquieu and John Adams, she interprets any element of egalitarianism as a rejection
of the republican ideology. In contrast, I view Jefferson's writing as consistently preoccupied
with the same basic dialectic, a dialectic of stability and dynamism. Professor Appleby's commitment to a linear interpretive framework in which there was a decisive break from republicanism to liberalism prevents her from seeing that Jefferson's view contained dialectical
components. Her claim that the 1790s were the crucial decade in which Jeffersonians led a
decisive break from the civic paradigm to create "the first truly American political movement," J. Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s,
at 4 (1984), suffers from the same urge to identify a time of linear transformation. Part V
argues that the same dialectic of stability versus dynamism continued to organize American
political-legal discourse throughout the 1790s. See text accompanying notes 259-312 infra.
35 One gap in Jefferson's conception of dynamic property-land in usufruct for the livingis that it could be used to justify actions by the present generation that undermine the ability of
future generations to enjoy any property. The doctrine of political relativism can provide a
paradoxical justification for the living-through exploitation of resources-to sell out the future, not just to cast off the shackles of the past. Willard Hurst's famous study of the Wisconsin lumber industry in the nineteenth century vividly chronicles exactly how Jefferson's
relativism can adopt this malignant form. See W. Hurst, Law and Economic Growth: The
Legal History of the Lumber Industry in Wisconsin, 1836-1915 (1964). According to Hurst,
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to be liberated from the past, from exactly what experiences were they
free? Did their rejection of the past commit them to embracing an unlimited future and, with it, change at the expense of stability, as Jefferson's linkage between social time and natural time suggested?
At the root of the concern with time was an anxiety about the type
of polity that Americans were creating and the relationship between the
individual and that polity. A mainstay of the republican ideology held
that a stable polity, and with it a stable institution of property, was the
central device for creating a political and social order in which individuals could and would pursue the public good. The function of property
was to anchor individual independence so that virtuous citizens were free
to pursue the common good. Within the republican vision, property
served to maintain the appropriate social and political order, rather than
to create individual wealth for its own sake. Yet, if generational political
and social transformation, as a result of the exercise of self-governance,
also was integral to the American polity, what hope was there for creating and maintaining the new nation as a stable and therefore virtuous
republic committed to the public good and not to personal interest? In
short, the doctrine that each generation was free to recreate its polity and
redefine its property rights from the ground up seemed to contradict the
requirements of republican politics-proper order, social stability, subordination of self-interest--even while it affirmed them. Jefferson's doctrine affirmatively embraced each generation's exercise of its power to
transgress settled practices and to recreate political institutions. 36 That
power is compatible with republicanism to the extent that republicanism
puts great emphasis on individuals' active and meaningful political participation. But insofar as republicanism includes a political vision of
maintaining traditions and institutions that help fix the social order, it
undermines republican tenets to celebrate the power to "destabilize" ex37
isting social practices, institutions, and traditions.
The political relativism doctrine potentially poses an even deeper
dilemma. Implicit in the idea that each generation retains the power to
the enormous growth of the lumber industry, which substantially destroyed Wisconsin's forests, resulted in part from an ambiguity in the discourse of public-land policy in the 1850s.
The prevailing slogan behind that policy was "what we do now counts most," a delphic phrase
wide enough to contain a tension between an egalitarian social-political ideal of small, independent farm owners even at the expense of future social wealth and a commitment to increasing productivity. See id. at 25-26, 40-47. Jefferson's conception of dynamic land
ownership can be understood as a progenitor of this ambiguity.
36 In this respect, Jefferson's political relativism doctrine prefigured Roberto Unger's political theory of "superliberalism." See R. Unger, Social Theory: Its Situation and Its Task 20915 (1987). In particular, Ungers notion of "destabilization rights" echoes the Jeffersonian
embrace of political re-creation. See R. Unger, False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social
Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy 530-35 (1987).
37 See note 6 supra.
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define its political and social order is the idea that that power resides in
each individual citizen of a given generation. At bottom, Jefferson's republicanism favors active and full political participation by individual
citizens. This power seems to affirm the power of each individual to call
into question the legitimacy of existing institutions and practices. Arguably, such participation is not possible unless each citizen is empowered to
participate equally. And as a practical matter, empowerment to participate requires a minimal level of material endowment. To be without
property is to be exposed to the raw power of those who have property.
This notion does not sit well with another aspect of republican
thought-community. Republicans envisioned the well-ordered society
as one whose members share at a very deep level certain values, ideas,
and aspirations. The idea that each individual has the power to dissent
from prevailing community sentiment perhaps can be made consistent
with the ideal of community if the individual's dissent is depicted as an
act of participation affirming that person's union with the polity.38 But
such an interpretation misreads the dissenter's message. It is the very
condition of being embedded in widely shared practices and institutions
that the dissenter fears. In promoting the individual power to dissent,
the Jeffersonian doctrine threatens to undermine republican social union.
In this respect Jeffersonian republicanism created a social dilemma far
more basic than the dilemma concerning the stability and change of
property rights over time.
The remainder of this Article describes in greater depth American
republican anxieties about commodified property, the sort evidenced in
Jefferson's writings, as a central aspect of modernity. Studying these
'3 9
anxieties is not an exercise in nostalgia for some "world we have lost."
Nor does it imply a wholesale denunciation of commodified property as a
social or economic system, or modernity as a form of cultural life. As
even those in Eastern and Central Europe who are currently experiencing
the pain that accompanies shifting to marketized property likely will attest, few would deliberately swap our current situation for the conditions
of the eighteenth-century premodern world. At the same time, however,
there is little basis for unqualified enthusiasm about the conditions of
social life in the modernist world with its marketized relationships.
Rather, there is good reason for the anxiety about our marketized culture
and society that seems evident not only in intellectual discourse, but in
ordinary daily life.
38 Cf. S. Shiffrin, The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance 90-96 (1990) (arguing
that dissent fosters engaged association).
39 P. Laslett, The World We Have Lost (1965).
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III
THE DIALECTICS OF PROPERTY IN CIVIC-REPUBLICAN
THOUGHT

It is illuminating to begin an examination of the role of property in
republican thought by contrasting it with the more familiar understanding of the function of property supplied by the political theory that C.B.
Macpherson called "possessive individualism." 4° Property plays as
prominent a role in civic-republican theory as it does in that tradition,
but the two ideologies attach strikingly different functions to property.
From the perspective of possessive individualism, property is the basis
for the categorical separation of private life from the public sphere. It is
the central mechanism by which autonomous individuals shield themselves from the potential of collective tyranny.4 1 The private realm, in
possessive individualist thought, inevitably reduces to property and consolidated ownership.4 2
Civic republicanism, both in revolutionary American thought and in
its earlier Harringtonian version,4 3 did not separate public and private
life categorically. Lacking a categorical opposition between polity and
individual, it did not assign a negative role to property. Protection
against collective action was not the exclusive, nor even the primary, role
of property in American civic republicanism. Instead, republicans conceived of property as necessary to facilitate a publicly active, self-governing citizenry. They believed that ownership of property provides the
necessary foundation for virtue, enabling citizens to pursue the common
welfare. J.G.A. Pocock has stated succinctly the republican function of
property: "The citizen possessed property in order to be autonomous and
autonomy was necessary for him to develop virtue or goodness as an
actor within the political, social and natural realm or order. He did not
possess it in order to engage in trade, exchange or profit; indeed, these
44
activities were hardly compatible with the activity of citizenship."
Property was valued "as a means of anchoring the individual in the
structure of power and virtue and liberating him to practice these
activities." 45
40 C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke
(1962).
41 See id. at 3 ("The human essence is freedom from dependence on the wills of others, and
freedom is a function of possession.").
42 For a recent statement of this position, see R. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the
Power of Eminent Domain 3-6 (1985).
43 See I. Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana (London 1656), reprinted in The
Political Works of James Harrington 155 (J.G.A. Pocock ed. 1977).
44 J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 15, at 103.
45 J. Appleby, supra note 34, at 9.
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On this view, individuals who did not own property were forced to
devote their attention to providing for their own personal welfare, exposing them to corrupting influences and distracting them from the public
good. John Adams expressed this concern when he asked rhetorically,
"[ils it not... true that men in general, in every society, who are wholly
destitute of property, are... too dependent on other men to have a will
of their own?... Such is the frailty of the human heart, that very few
men who have no property, have any judgment of their own."6
American civic republicans, then, understood property within the
framework of a conflict between "autonomy" and "dependency." Autonomy was considered a necessary condition for virtue, while dependency seemed to undermine it. Jefferson expressed the civic-republican
meaning of dependency in his Notes on the State of Virginia, stating,
"[d]ependence begets subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of
virtue, and prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition." 4 7
A.

Static vs. Dynamic Property

As will be shown, Jefferson's use of a metaphor of manufacturing in
this passage is especially significant because it gives a particular, if not
contradictory, content to the abstract republican notion of property as
the foundation of the political, social, and moral order. American republicanism failed to specify what type of property-land or commodity
ownership, for example-was required for property to perform this function, or whether any one type of property was required. 4 8 Arguing, as
republicans did, that property has an important social function, begs the
question as to what specifically the institution of property in a republic
should amount. Could a republic survive if forms of property ownership
were dynamic, continually free to change as social and economic conditions changed, or did these forms have to be static, maintaining a certain
type? Related to this question was an ambiguity concerning the character of property as mobile or immobile. In practice, for property to
change form would seem to require a high degree of alienability, while
for a particular form of property to remain in place, its mobility (or exchangeability) seemingly would be restricted. These two meanings of republican property were not simply different; they were, at least,
potentially contradictory-a fact the abstract notion of republican property obscured. The static meaning implied a greater degree of control
46 Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776), reprinted in 9 The Works of
John Adams 376 (C. Adams ed. 1854) [hereinafter Adams Works].
47 T. Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 157 (Torchbook ed. 1964) (London 1787).
48 There certainly was no ambiguity about Harrington's view on this question. He thought
it was crucial to republican virtue that citizens not only be settled on land but own land in
inheritable fee simple estates. See J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 4, at 387-91.
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over property to maintain its preferred form. On its surface, the dynamic
meaning required little or no social control of property, only collective
restrictions to maintain its alienability being necessary.
It is crucial to emphasize that both these meanings of property were
"republican" in the sense that they involved different readings of the
commitments to the republic, civic virtue, and the common good. This
point is lost on those who have read Jefferson's writings on the benefits of
cultivated land owned in fee simple and worked by citizen-owners, the
republic as constituted by the "fee simple empire,"'49 as representing the
paradigm of republican property. 50 This latter interpretation sees Jefferson's thought as built around a defense of landed as against commercial
forms of property. In fact, the concept of "commerce" did play, as this
interpretation suggests, a crucial role in Jefferson's republican discourse,
just as it did in the discourse of English republicans. The opposition,
rather, was between the cultivation of agricultural property, which he
assumed to have a commercial dimension, and industrial property, that
is, manufacturing. While he considered that "[tlhe small landowners are
the most precious part of a state," 51 Jefferson viewed "the class of artificers" as "the panders of vice and the instruments by which the liberties
'52
of a country are generally overturned.
To Jefferson, expressing a vision that he inherited from seventeenthcentury republican thought and that he bequeathed to nineteenth-century agrarian economic reformers, 53 an economy dominated by "artifi49 The phrase is taken from H. Smith, Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and
Myth 133 (1950).
50 See, e.g., J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 4, at 532-33. For a criticism of this interpretation,
see Appleby, Commercial Framing and the "Agrarian Myth" in the Early Republic, 68 J. Am.
Hist. 833 (1982).
51 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), reprinted in 8 Jefferson
Papers, supra note 25, at 681-82. Several years earlier, Jefferson expressed the same theme in
Notes on the State of Virginia: "Those who labour in the earth are the chosen people of God, if
ever he had a chosen people." T. Jefferson, supra note 47, at 157.
52 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jay (Aug. 23, 1785), reprinted in 8 Jefferson Papers, supra note 25, at 426. Jefferson later revised his general hostility toward manufacturing,
applying his earlier critique that those who labor in manufacturing become dependent on manufacturing only to the "great cities in the old countries." The American republic, on this later
view, was immune to this critique because of the abundance of Western land. See T. Jefferson,
supra note 47, at 157. This was an early example of the idea Henry Nash Smith has called
"the West as safety valve." See H. Smith, supra note 49, at 201-10.
In this passage Jefferson also was contributing to an extremely important eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century American social myth-the myth of the garden. See generally L. Marx,
The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America (1964). Land's
symbolic role within this mythology was to mask "poverty and industrial strife with the pleasing suggestion that a beneficent nature stronger than any human agency, the ancient resource
of Americans, the power that had made the country rich and great, would solve the new
problems of industrialism." H. Smith, supra note 49, at 206.
53 See generally L. Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America
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cers" subverted republican liberty by creating a two-class society in
which class defined one's dependence or independence. Manufacturers
would acquire a monopoly of sovereignty, political and economic. Laborers would lack the necessary conditions for meaningful participation
in public life. Property could not take predominately the form of manufacturing processes and manufactured goods if American society were to
be viable as a republic. Reinforcing this view, Jefferson stated in his
Notes on the State of Virginia:
[G]enerally speaking, the proportion which the aggregate of the other
classes of citizens bears in any state to that of its husbandmen, is the
proportion of its unsound to its healthy parts, and is a good-enough
barometer whereby to measure its degree of corruption. While we
have land to labour then, let us never wish to see our citizens occupied
4
at a work-bench, or twirling a distaff.
Yet Jefferson hardly was prepared to banish commerce. He accepted
commerce not merely as economically expedient or inevitable for any
nation's survival, but as freedom-enhancing in certain passages. Thus, he
continued:
Our interest will be to throw open the doors of commerce, and to
knock off all its shackles, giving perfect freedom to all persons for the
vent of whatever they may chuse to bring into our ports, and asking
the same in theirs.... []t might be better for us to abandon the ocean
altogether, that being the element whereon we shall be principally exposed to jostle with other nations; to leave to others to bring what we
shall want, and to carry what we can spare. This would make us invulnerable to Europe, by offering none of our property to their prize, and
would turn all our citizens to the cultivation of the earth ....5
What is operating in these passages is less an opposition between
agrarian-the proper form of property-and commerce than the dialectic between static and dynamic property that generally characterized the
eighteenth-century American republican understanding of the relationship between property and republican democracy. On the one hand, the
republic may be threatened fatally if property is transformed readily
from an agricultural into an industrial and completely commodified
form. On the other hand, throwing open our doors to foreign commerce
represented the embracing of a form of economic dynamism. To be sure,
Jefferson seems to have advocated an international division of labor that
was itself static. This division of labor, though, made American open(1976). William Simon discusses the relationship between this agrarian republican vision and
the critique of corporate capitalism by market socialists in a very interesting paper. See W.
Simon, supra note 10.
54 T. Jefferson, supra note 47, at 157-58.
55 Id. at 164-65.
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ness to foreign commerce crucial to the preservation of an agrarian econ56
omy. Paradoxically, economic stability required economic dynamism.
It complemented that doctrine to the extent that it preserved each generation's independence, so that each generation remained able to practice
self-governance. Yet there is a catch-22 in this theory. It is not clear
how the doctrine of political relativism could be reconciled with the need
to maintain property in an agricultural mode, whose very stasis implies
intergenerational control. Under the doctrine of political relativism,
would not each generation be free to cast off the previous generation's
commitment to any particular form of property-indeed, any form of
government-and decide for itself what type of property and form of
government best suited its own needs? To see how Jefferson evaded this
dilemma, one must examine how the dialectic of stasis and dynamism
informed Jeffersonian discourse about the mobility and distribution of
property.
B.

Mobility and Distribution

The ambiguity over the meaning of republican property concerning
stasis or change also affected the related questions of the proper mobility
and distribution of property. Jefferson and others viewed the unequal
distribution of property, specifically land, as incompatible with republicanism. Writing from Fountainbleau in 1785, Jefferson observed that the
high degree of concentration of French land in the hands of the aristocracy caused high unemployment, as French landowners left their lands
uncultivated for hunting. He then reiterated a view that he propounded
throughout his career:
I am conscious that an equal degree of property is impracticable. But
the consequences of this enormous inequality producing so much misery to the bulk of mankind, legislators cannot invent too many devices
go
for subdividing property, only taking care to let their subdivisions
57
hand in hand with the natural affections of the human mind.
The dilemma was how to prevent unequal distribution of land from
undermining republican virtue while pragmatically acknowledging the
"natural affections of the human mind" to truck, barter, and trade that
were embodied in the concept of individual ownership.5 8 John Adams,
It also bears mention that Jefferson's suggestion, which his fear of dependence on manufacturing prompted, did not succeed in removing that threat altogether. Rather, it substituted
external dependence on other nations for internal dependence so that America could remain
republicanly agrarian.
57 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), reprinted in 8 Jefferson
Papers, supra note 25, at 682.
58 Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (Apr. 26, 1776), reprinted in 9 Adams
Works, supra note 46, at 376.
56
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citing Harrington's assertion that power always follows property,5 9 had
expressed the recurrent anxiety about the consequences for republican
virtue in terms of a need to maintain a balance of property in order to
maintain a balance of power:
The only possible way... of preserving the balance of power on the
side of equal liberty and public virtue is to make the acquisition of land
easy to every member of society; to make a division of land into small
quantities, so that the multitude may be possessed of landed estates. 6°
Jefferson's solution was similar but more complete. He proposed
that the state distribute equally to all takers unowned land and that inherited property be divided equally among heirs, while also protecting
existing property rights against governmental redistribution. 61 It was
this accommodationist strategy that underlay, for example, his wellknown reforms of Virginia inheritance law, including the abolition of pri62
mogeniture in favor of partible inheritance and the abolition of entail.
The strategy was for the state to take advantage of the abundance of
uncultivated land in the American West and assure each able-bodied citizen a relatively small parcel which, through cultivation, would make that
citizen self-sustaining and protect the personal autonomy secured
63
through ownership.
But that strategy was incomplete. It failed to indicate whether there
existed any assurance that autonomous owners would not exercise their
right to transfer land and thereby upset the proper egalitarian distribution scheme. 64 For his part, Jefferson never seemed to question the
power of citizens to transfer ownership-that is, to commodify land-an
idea well established in the existing common law. 65 Again, the static aspect of republican property clashed with the dynamic by asserting the
dependence of the republic upon an ideal type of property, that is, land,
so
and an ideal form of property holding, that is, fee-simple ownership,
66
commodity.
mere
a
into
degenerating
from
land
as to prevent
59

See id.

60 Id.
61 See Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J.

Law & Econ. 467 (1976).
62 See Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the American Revolutionary
Era, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1977).
63 Indicative of this strategy was Jefferson's bill to the Virginia legislature in 1778 proposing that every freeborn Virginian who married and resided in that state for one year receive
"seventy five Acres of waste or unappropriated Land." Bill for Establishing a Land Office
(Jan. 8, 1778), reprinted in 2 Jefferson Papers, supra note 25, at 139-40. The proposal, however, never was enacted. 2 Jefferson Papers, supra note 25, at 147 n.12.
64 See text accompanying notes 57-61 supra.
65 See J. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 223-25 (2d ed. 1979) (alienability was accepted attribute of possession of real property since before 1290).
66 On the theme of stability in the American civic-republican vision, see J. Appleby, supra
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It was not the rise of commerce per se, but the potential for commerce to transform the sociology of property that aroused the Jeffersonian anxiety. Acts of free exchange always could precipitate a social
transformation that would change the meaning of freehold land from a
stable social foundation to a fluid item of commerce. Were this to happen, property would no longer constitute an aspect of virtuous personality but rather would represent a mere artifact of private life. So
transformed, property might become a solvent that dissolves the political
bonds of the community. 67
Interpreted into modem terms, the anxiety was that property, reduced to a mere commodity, would come to dominate social relations.
Individuals would relate to each other as interchangeable buyers or sellers in the marketplace rather than as land-holding neighbors and human
beings. In this respect, the civic-republican critique of commodified
property anticipated the modem theme that connects highly mobile
forms of property with the phenomenon of alienation in social relations.
Although the concept of alienation did not flower until the next century,
its seed was planted well before then. It exists in all theories that define
and self-governance
the role of property in terms of self-development
68
others.
with
union
realized through
The real world phenomenon that prompted the Jeffersonian anxiety
was the rapid development of intangible forms of property, especially
credit. 69 These interests, which seemed to be based on nothing more real
than a guess about the future, appeared indistinguishable from the "expectancies" that the common law long had held not to be property. 70 A
recurrent theme of eigheenth-century writers who opposed the rise of a
credit-based economy was the fear that permitting ephemeral interests to
operate as property would destabilize the proper social order. 7 1 More
fundamentally, it would destroy the autonomy that land ownership pronote 34, at 37-38. On the theme of stability in earlier versions of the republican tradition, see
generally J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 4.

67 This concern about dynamic, marketized property undermining communal ties is not
unique to the civic-republican tradition. Hegel had expressed the same view in pointing out
the benefits of stable property, especially land used for agriculture. See G. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right §§ 203, 305-307 (T. Knox trans. 1952) (n.p. 1821).
68 See generally A. Ryan, Property and Political Theory (1984) (arguing that western philosophies of private property can be organized according to whether they are instrumental or
self-developmental).
69 For discussions of the rise of credit at this time, see F. McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum:
The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 138-42 (1985); J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 4, at
423-61.

70 See L. Simes & A. Smith, The Law of Future Interests 2 (2d ed. 1956); see, e.g., In re
Baker, 13 F.2d 707 (6th Cir.) (expectancy not property and cannot become property even by
valid conveyance between heirs), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 733 (1926).
71 See, e.g., C. Secondat [Baron de Montesquieu], De l'Esprit des Lois, Oeuvres Compl6tes

bk. 22, ch. xix (Paris 1748) (discussing conversion of "cr&tit" to "confiance").

HeinOnline -- 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 292 1991

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

May 1991]

REPUBLICAN DIALECTICS

vided and, with it, the moral personality upon which the republic
depended.
We must recall, though, that stability was only one-half of the dialectical understanding of property in American civic republicanism. The
other half of that understanding was the fluidity of property that republicans sought to promote even while they feared it. Jefferson's proposal to
"throw open the doors of commerce" 7 2 suggests that what he rejected
was not commerce itself but an empire of commerce in which fluid and
intangible property replaced stable cultivated land. What was called for
was a "dynamism of virtue" to counterbalance the "dynamism of commerce." 73 Making virtue dynamic required not that land be commodifled, but that the state take steps to ensure its "natural" circulation was
not impeded. Jefferson's efforts to amend the law of inheritance followed
from this vision of transforming land ownership from the static condition
that characterized English land law-in which strict settlements, entails,
and primogeniture allowed the heads of a few privileged families to retain
large portions of land for successive generations-into a dynamic
phenomenon.
As modem debates in property theory evidence, the dynamic element of Jeffersonian thought does not sit well with the antinomic concern for stability. For example, recent law-and-economics scholarship
has argued that government must protect the free transferability of resources if the market is to remain the central device for allocating economic resources. 74 This meaning of alienability trades on a meaning of
property as market commodity. Yet modem critics of the economic paradigm regard that meaning as incompatible, at least in some circumstances, with the ideal of human flourishing.7 5 Echoing Marx, they
worry that market alienability is alienating. While neither of these interpretations was unambiguously part of the legal consciousness of civic
republicans, elements of both can be found in the late eighteenth-century
legal debate. American republican writers simultaneously depicted the
free transferability of property as liberating and threatening. 76 It liberates individuals from one form of dependency, feudal hierarchy, 77 but
72 See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
73 See J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 4, at 535 (discussing the notion of a dynamism in virtue

as it appears in the works of other American republican writers of the early 1800s).
74 See, e.g., Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347 (1967).
75 See, e.g., Radin, supra note 13, at 1852-55, 1870-77.
76 For a discussion of this, see Banning, Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited, 43 Wm. & Mary
Q. 32 (1986).
77 The clearest example in eighteenth-century American republican discourse of the association of social hierarchy with feudalism is Adams, A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law, Boston Gazette, Aug. 12, 1765, reprinted in 1 The Papers of John Adams 111 (R.
Taylor, M. Kline & G. Lint eds. 1977) [hereinafter Adams Papers].
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exposes them to another dependency, markets and manufacturing. By
debasing the moral personality of individuals and the polity, the free
transferability policy would create a new form of dependency. 78 Individuals would be subjects of the market, and the common welfare would be
subordinated to the limitless pursuit of self-interest.
C

Balance and the Problem of HierarchyBased on Property

To conflate dynamic property with commodity ownership-the
market as a device for regulating scarcity-would pervert the civic-republican ideal that Jefferson articulated. The ideal was republican in that
it carried forward from James Harrington a fundamental concern for the
inequality of land distribution, the social hierarchy that such distribution
caused, and the corruption of character that resulted from both of these
inequities. 79 John Adams, for example, repeating Harrington's doctrine
of balance, asserted that "power always follows property.... [T]he balance of power in a society, accompanies the balance of property in
land." 80 But the meanings that the eighteenth-century American republicans imputed to Harrington's doctrine of balance modified that doctrine
in crucial respects.
For Harrington, popular government depended on the enactment of
agrarian law. The objective of agrarian law was to assure that "the property in lands be so diffused through the whole people that neither one
landlord nor a few landlords over-balance them."8 1 Agrarian law represented a direct exercise of government power to maintain an equal distri82
bution of land, which could not thereafter be upset by the market.
78 The republican anxiety about freely transferable property also anticipated two further
modem dilemmas. The first is the problem in liberal political theory that the free-transferability policy depends upon the exercise of the very source of dependency that the policy is intended to avoid, namely, state power. The second is the social dilemma that commodifying all
assets in the name of freedom of the market creates the risk of social exploitation within market relations. Eighteenth-century republicans evaded these dilemmas, however, by defining
time as the central question about property and property law in the new nation. This is not to
suggest that eighteenth-century writers were aware of either dilemma. Their discourse of commerce and property must be understood within the context of a culture that was preoccupied
with moral personality and that linked the creation of that personality with the ready availability of land, not within a structure of meaning constructed from the concepts of profit and
market commodity. My point is that their discourse gives meaning to us within the context of
our dilemmas of free alienation of property.
79 On Harrington, see J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 4, at 386-88.
80 Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776), reprinted in 9 Adams
Works, supra note 46, at 376.
81 J. Harrington, The Prerogative of Popular Government (London 1658), reprinted in The
Political Works of James Harrington 458 (J.G.A. Pocock ed. 1977) [hereinafter Harrington
Works].
82 See id. ("so an agrarian [law] is a law fixing the balance of a government, in such manner
that it cannot alter"), reprinted in Harrington Works, supra note 81, at 459.
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Freedom could be anchored only in an equal distribution of land; inherited, not acquired through speculation; and owned in fee simple.
Adams seemed to adopt this doctrine of balance when he argued
that "[t]he only possible way, then, of preserving the balance of power on
the side of equal liberty and public virtue, is to make the acquisition of
land easy to every member of society; to make a division of the land into
small quantities, so that the multitude may be possessed of landed estates."83s Note, however, that by this formulation Adams, like Jefferson,
added a dynamic element to Harrington's view of property. Harrington
viewed dynamic property as a direct threat to balance; he was solely concerned with stability. Thus he considered partible inheritance, rather
than grant, to be the preferred method for acquiring land. Once acquired, land was to be used for possession, not exchange. He disfavored
trade in land because of its propensity to undermine balance and recreate
inequality and dependency. 84 In Adams's hands, dynamic property became an antidote to inequality and hierarchy. On his understanding,
Harrington's preoccupation with stability caused him to miss the important connection between stability and antidemocratic aristocracy based
on "privilege" and "luxury." On Adams's view, property had to be dynamic precisely because it then could destroy the basis for an aristocracy
of privilege and luxury. Hence the true goal of property law was to liberate land by removing entanglements on fee-simple ownership that prevented every ordinary citizen from obtaining a parcel of land. Liberating
land, Adams and Jefferson thought, meant liberating the individual.
We can see this dynamic view of property at work in the American
civic-republican critique of primogeniture and entailments. Inheritance
was the aspect of the common law of property about which eighteenthcentury American republican lawyers expressed the greatest concern. 85
Within the law of inheritance, no topics had greater importance to these
writers than primogeniture and entailment of land.8 6 It may seem odd
that even eighteenth-century American lawyers would have been so preoccupied with these common-law doctrines. After all, several colonial
legislatures already had abolished either or both primogeniture and entailments of land.87 Recent scholarship further indicates that even where
these devices were legally recognized, they were not widely used.88 But
83 Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776), reprinted in 9 Adams
Works, supra note 46, at 376.
94 See Pocock, Historical Introduction, in Harrington Works, supra note 81, at 1, 60-61.
85 See Katz, supra note 62.
86 See Morris, Primogeniture and Entailed Estates in America, 27 Colum. L. Rev. 24, 2425 (1927).
87 See Katz, supra note 62, at 11-14.
88 See, e.g., P. Greven, Four Generations: Population, Land, and Family in Colonial
Andover, Massachusetts 133-35 (1970); C. Shammas, M. Salmon & M. Dahlin, Inheritance in
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the significance of these devices-and of the legal writing attacking
them-lies in their symbolic role rather than their functional effect.
The doctrine of primogeniture provided that when a man died without a legally effective will his lands descended to his eldest son, although
his personal property was distributed in equal shares to his sons and
daughters, with a portion reserved for his surviving spouse. 89 A wealthy
landowner easily could block the doctrine's operation, of course, merely
by devising his land by will. At the same time, however, this option did
not guarantee that the land would be divided equally among the children.
Eighteenth-century American landowners enjoyed a high degree of freedom of testation and could exercise that freedom to produce the same
pattern of distribution as primogeniture did. 9° Moreover, from the perspective of consolidating land ownership within the family for the purpose of maintaining dynastic family power, devises were far less effective
and less used as means of supporting family dynasties among American
estate holders than among English landowners of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. 9 1
Along with primogeniture, the device that American republican
lawyers who despised English landed aristocracy associated most closely
with the landed English family dynasty was the entailment of land. Reduced to its bare essentials, the entail's purpose was to maintain land
within the family by restricting the power of the persons to whom the
testator devised land to transfer the land. 92 This was an entail's purpose,
but not its invariable effect, as numerous means existed for breaking entailments. However, it appears that in England the more commonly used
device to keep land within the family was the so-called strict settlement,
an elaborate arrangement for transferring land and restraining its future
alienability. 93 The strict settlement, whose enforcement was the work of
the English equity courts, was little used in America, owing in part to an
absence in most colonies of a separate equity system.94 With the strict
settlement generally unavailable to American testators in the seventeenth
America: From Colonial Times to the Present 30-51 (1987); Keim, Primogeniture and Entail
in Colonial Virginia, 25 Win. & Mary Q. 545, 545-48 (1968). Keim's paper reveals that
although primogeniture and entail existed in Virginia until 1785, neither was a prevailing custom in colonial Virginia, which had just the aristocratic, agrarian class that one would expect
to engage in these inheritance practices. Id.
89 See Keim, supra note 88, at 557.

90 See L. Friedman, A History of American Law 66-68 (2d ed. 1985).
91 For a brief comparison of the testamentary practices of English and colonial American

elites in the eighteenth century, see C. Shammas, M. Salmon & M. Dahlin, supra note 88, at
33-35, 39.

92 See J. Baker, supra note 65, at 234 (dynastic instinct as major motivation for fee tail).
93 See generally L. Bonfield, Marriage Settlements, 1601-1740: The Adoption of the Strict
Settlement (1983).
94 See C. Shammas, M. Salmon & M. Dahlin, supra note 88, at 34-35.
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and early eighteenth centuries, the entail was virtually the only testamentary device for maintaining family control of land.
As was mentioned above, the institutions of primogeniture and the
entailment never really took root in American law. As a result, historians usually have been content to explain their disappearance by means of
a functionalist argument. Economic conditions, in particular the abun-

dance of land in the colonies, the argument runs, vitiated the need of
wealthy American testators for legal devices designed to assure the family's foundation on large concentrations of land. 95 But this interpretation
tells only part of the story. In particular, it ignores the continued sym-

bolic importance of these institutions in republican political discourse on
both sides of the Atlantic. English and Continental lawyers had debated
96
the benefits of primogeniture heatedly since the sixteenth century.
That debate yielded no consensus, and its enduring effect was to cripple
the stature of primogeniture within English legal culture even prior to its

rejection in America. 97 Similarly, but less intensely, early modem English lawyers had attacked entailments of land, arguing that the indestructibility of entails "would put a stop to commerce and prevent the
circulation of the riches of the kingdom" and that such devices conflicted
with the common law's supposedly fundamental commitment to freedom
of alienation. 98 Later still, lawyers, philosophers, historians, and political
economists of the Scottish Enlightenment (with whom American legal
writers in the late eighteenth century were familiar)9 9 relentlessly attacked primogeniture and especially entails as antiquated and socially

harmful. 1°0 Most important for eighteenth-century American lawyers,

95 See, e.g., D. Allen, In English Ways: The Movement of Societies and the Transferal of
English Local Law and Custom to Massachusetts Bay in the Seventeenth Century (1981) (outlining colonial land systems as derivative of English land systems); R. Morris, Studies in the
History of American Law (1930) (describing how fee-simple conveyances came to supplant
primogeniture and entails in colonial America); Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom in
Seventeenth-Century New England, 31 Colum. L. Rev. 416 (1931) (exploring local customary
law in the Plymouth Settlement).
96 On the European debate concerning primogeniture, see Thirsk, The European Debate
on Customs of Inheritance 1500-1700, in Family and Inheritance 177 (J. Goody, J. Thirsk &
E. Thompson eds. 1976).
97 See id. at 189-91.
98 See Cooper, Patterns of Inheritance and Settlement by Great Landowners from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, in Family and Inheritance 192, 193 (J. Goody, J. Thirsk &
E. Thompson eds. 1976). On the other hand, writers like Sir Matthew Hale developed functional arguments in favor of entails, contending that favoring the eldest son forced younger
sons, who otherwise remained idle, to seek socially useful occupations. See M. Hale, The
History of the Common Law of England 142 (1971).
99 On American awareness of Scottish Enlightenment writings, see the very helpful account in Hamburger, The Constitution's Accommodation of Social Change, 88 Mich. L. Rev.
239, 254-58 (1989) (citing sources).
100 See note 104 infra.
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republican political theory since Harrington regarded both devices as incompatible with republican principles. Republican regimes required
partible inheritance as an aspect of the Harringtonian principle of

balance.101
Reinforcing the republican antipathy to these devices were the cus-

tomary inheritances practices of various groups in the colonies10 2 and
American lawyers' conception of the historic common law.10 3 Yet
American legal writers' republican concern for corruption prompted
their hatred of primogeniture and especially of entailments of land,
which appeared to be the most glaring vestiges of a corrupt past. They
associated that past with the English social hierarchy of land. Moreover,
they associated that social order, indeed, social hierarchy in general, with
"feudal" encrustations on the common law of property. 1°4 To both Ad101 See text accompanying notes 79-84 supra. Preambles to late eighteenth-century American statutes repealing primogeniture and entail drew on the balance of property principle explicitly. The preamble to the 1794 Delaware statute, for example, stated: "[I]t is the duty and
policy of every republican government to preserve equality amongst its citizens, by maintaining the balance of property as far as is consistent with the rights of individuals." 2 Laws of the
State of Delaware ch. 53 (S. Adams & J. Adams eds. 1797).
102 In recent years, American historiographers have interpreted colonial life as characterized by a plurality of customary practices and beliefs among small communities. See Henretta,
Families and Farms: Mentalitd in Pre-Industrial America, 35 Win. & Mary Q. 3 (1978);
Roeber, In German Ways? Problems and Potentials of Eighteenth-Century German Social and
Emigration History, 44 Win. & Mary Q. 750 (1987); Warden, Law Reform in England and
New England, 1620-1660, 35 Win. & Mary Q. 668 (1978); Waters, Family, Inheritance, and
Migration in Colonial New England: The Evidence from Guilford, Connecticut, 39 Wm. &
Mary Q. 64 (1982). To some extent these differences were the result of particular customs that
colonists brought with them from their European communities. With respect to inheritance
practices, the persistence of local customary practices did not always cut against primogeniture. Professor Waters, for example, argues that colonial New Englanders generally believed
in and practiced unequal treatment among heirs. See id. For a critical assessment of the
emphasis on discontinuities among local customary practices, see Ruttman, Assessing the Little Communities in Early America, 43 Win. & Mary Q. 163 (1986).
103 Thus, I am not suggesting that the American critique of primogeniture and entailments
was motivated solely by a republican ideology. In interpreting the eighteenth-century elite
American legal writers' attacks on primogeniture and entail, one must take into account John
Reid's thesis that the American revolution was a controversy about law and that the revolutionaries' driving force was largely a constitutional vision framed by the common law. See J.
Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority of Rights (1986); see
also J. Greene, Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities
of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788 (1986) (showing continuity and importance of constitutional organization in the colonial period). This Article argues that the line
between republican ideology and the common-law mentalitj of the American revolutionaries
was not categorical. Republican politics was not distinct from law. Indeed, a central challenge
(perhaps the central challenge) to the American revolutionaries, both during and after the
Revolution, was to reconcile retention of much of the common law of property with the very
act of revolution. It was the republican ideology, re-created by American revolutionaries
(most of whose leaders were lawyers, trained in the English common law), that was the path
they took to effect this reconciliation.
104 Linking entailments to feudal law was not a critique unique to American republicans.
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ares and Jefferson, it was precisely the feudal law of property that denied
autonomy to individuals, rendering them powerless and dependent.10 5 It
was crucial to both republican ideology and the American common-law
mentalitd, then, to repudiate primogeniture and entail, despite the fact
that they were not used with great frequency. Primogeniture and entailment symbolized the undesirable consequences of stability of property
that required a dynamic of property to counteract. The release of land
from these feudal constraints meant a release of individuals from dependency and inequality.0 6
Scottish Enlightenment writers, particularly Lord Kames, pursued the same strategy. Entails
followed, Kames argued, from the very nature of feudalism, which he labelled a "violent system, repugnant to natural principles." Home, Lord Kames, History of Property, in 1 Historical Law Tracts 197 (n.p. 1776). From the perspective of the Scottish writers, what made
entails objectionable was that they removed large amounts of land from circulation, thereby
frustrating the needs of a commercial society. Paralleling arguments developed by Adam
Smith, see 1 A. Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence 69-71 (R. Meek, D. Raphael & P. Stein eds.
1978), Kames contended that "no circumstance tends more to the advancement of commerce
than a free circulation of the goods of fortune from hand to hand." H. Home, Lord Kames,
The Principles of Equity 259 (Edinburgh 1760). This, of course, is quite a different basis from
which to attack entails than that provided by traditional republicanism. The Scottish critique
of entails, which was well known to American republican elite lawyers like Jefferson, see A.
Hook, Scotland and America: A Study of Cultural Relations, 1750-1835 (1975), thus was an
important instance in which republican ideology and commercial ideology complemented each
other. Such instances of overlap were sources of ambiguity and paradox that facilitated the
subsequent transformation of civic-republican legal thought under the influence of commercial
ideology. See text accompanying note 219 infra. On Kames's role in the Scottish Enlightenment critique of entails, see Lieberman, The Legal Needs of a Commercial Society: The Jurisprudence of Lord Kames, in Wealth & Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the
Scottish Enlightenment 203 (1. Hont & M. Ignatieff eds. 1983).
105 See Adams, supra note 77, No. 1, reprinted in 1 Adams Papers, supra note 77, at 112-15;
for Jefferson's views, see his correspondence with Edmund Pendleton concerning Jefferson's
proposal to abolish all feudal tenures, reprinted in 1 Jefferson Papers, supra note 25, at 484508.
106 1 am suggesting here that in the republican dialogue about property we will find antecedents of the theme of "the release of energy" that Willard Hurst has described as characterizing
nineteenth-century legal thought and practice. See W. Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century United States 3-32 (1956). I also am arguing that the origins
of a dynamic conception of property in American legal discourse are to be found earlier than
Morton Horwitz claims. See M. Horwitz, supra note 2, at 31-62. The republican (Jeffersonian) understanding of dynamic property differs, however, from the form of dynamism that
Hurst and Horwitz have in mind. Republican dynamism seeks to release land from social
hierarchy, created by legal restraints, so that land will be used as the basis for responsible selfgovernance. Land, in other words, first must be made dynamic to serve its proper public role.
Market dynamism seeks to liberate land (and all other forms of payments) from restraints so
that it is available to satisfy individual wants. Hurst and Horwitz are correct in that the legal
developments that best exemplified the market conception of dynamic property occurred in the
nineteenth century. Even in the nineteenth century, however, there were traces of republican
dynamism at work. Examples include the Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392, which
contemplated (but only incompletely achieved) an initial distribution of clear title in relatively
small parcels of government-owned land to individuals conditioned merely on their working
the land themselves, and the prior-appropriation system of allocating water rights. The purpose of these legal rules was not to enable homesteaders to trade the land for other forms of
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The civic-republican dynamic of property, then, stood in a dialectical relation to components of stability that also were vital to American
civic republicanism. Property-land-needed to be unencumbered to
avoid privilege and inequality, but it also had to be stable-that is, nontransferable-to avoid being reduced to a mere commodity, the object of
acquisitive pursuit that would destroy republican virtue. This dialectic
posed a dilemma: how would the necessary stability of property be secured without undermining the possibility of dynamic property and egalitarianism? Stability meant not only that the dominant form of property
in society had to remain constant, specifically that it had to be tangible
agricultural property rather than industrial and intangible property, but
also that its public meaning as the anchor of a virtuous civic life had to
resist any metamorphosis reducing the meaning of property to that of
commodity, the mere object of an acquisitive spirit. These two aspects of
stability affected each other because, as republicans like Jefferson understood the logic of commerce, if property came to be understood as a commodity, then its dominant social form would shift from stable fee-simple
ownership to a series of speculative sales and purchases. Conversely, if
intangibles came to displace cultivated land as the socially dominant
form of wealth, then the public meaning of property would shift to the
framework of the self-interested, nonpolitical speculator. This change in
the public meaning of property would represent a change in the relational aspect of property. Civic property, property as the basis for sociality and participation, would be replaced by self property, property as the
basis for personal gain. The danger was in allowing the forces of dynamism to undermine completely stability and sociality.
How, then, could stability and dynamism both be given their due?
The Harringtonian "solution"1o7 simply repeated the problem. The legal
system had to impose restraints on the transferability of land both to
prevent persons to whom the government had distributed land from using their land as a commodity for speculation and to prevent the formation of family dynasties. Jefferson made slightly further headway. His
inheritance-law reforms paradoxically imposed collective restraints on
freedom of alienability to encourage the transfer of property so as to prevent landed dynasties. Yet this idea and his doctrine of political relativism also implicitly denied that ownership was or could be thoroughly
property. It rather was to provide average persons with the means to satisfy their needs so that
they would not be dependent on others. Of course, neither the Homestead Act nor the priorappropriation system were effective in realizing republican goals. Under prior appropriation,
water rights themselves became a highly marketable commodity, while enforcement of the
homestead restrictions was notoriously weak. On the Homestead Act, see L. Friedman, supra
note 90, at 416-19. On the prior appropriation system, see id. at 365-66.
107 See text accompanying notes 80-82 supra.
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privatized.10 8 The latter doctrine, in particular, embraced each generation's power to re-create the configuration of property rights, allowing
the republican polity to limit the alienation of land to whatever extent
was needed to create the necessary conditions for republican politics. 10 9
In short, Jefferson never adequately explained how the law of property could accommodate stability and dynamism. Part of the reason for
this is that he sometimes assumed away the problem by arguing that collective restraints aimed at limiting the dynamic component of property
(land speculation) were unnecessary. Individuals would, he argued,
choose cultivation over manufacturing or speculation if given the choice.
So long as land, owned in fee simple for cultivation, was available to
them, Americans would of their own accord preserve the dialectic of stability and dynamism. Individuals pursued nonvirtuous modes of property and ownership in the past, he thought, only because they lacked any
choice. "In Europe the lands are either cultivated, or locked up against
the cultivator. Manufacture must therefore be resorted to of necessity
not of choice, to support the surplus of the people. But we have an immensity of land courting the industry of the husbandman."' 10 The seemingly unlimited supply of land available for cultivation placed Americans
in a historically unique situation of being able to escape from the constraints that had dictated the corruption of property in Europe.
One might speculate about an even deeper concern underlying Jefferson's dilemma. His unwillingness to abandon entirely the principle of
freedom of alienation stems from the link between individual freedom of
alienation with republican personal independence. The republican meaning of independence is that individual citizens are politically autonomous. While republicans traditionally argued that individuals
experienced political autonomy through participation, autonomy, understood as freedom from corruption, also required that individuals be free
to choose among alternative political locales. In the modem idiom, as a
political option, "exit" might be preferable to "voice" under some circumstances.1 11 Moreover, as public-choice theory recognizes, political
voice is more effective if local governments know that the threat of exit is
108 Staughton Lynd has pointed out that the principle that the earth belongs to the living
"approached most nearly the socialist conception that living labor has claims superior to any
property rights." S. Lynd, Intellectual Origins of American Radicalism 77 (1968).
109 Indeed, unless restricted to changes that were consistent with republican principles, the
doctrine permitted the destruction of republican politics itself. Jefferson never addressed
whether the doctrine was so restricted, but even if such a restriction is implied, there remains
the task of explaining how such a denial of self-governance can be reconciled with the republican ideal.
110 T. Jefferson, supra note 47, at 157.
111See A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (1970).
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maximized.'1 2 Maintaining individual freedom to transfer one's property, or at least those assets that anchor individuals to one locale, preserves personal mobility. Broad legal restrictions on the individual
power to dispose of land, then, might threaten the citizen-farmers' political independence by effectively tying them to one locale and thereby
weakening their political voice. Yet the problem remained that unless
such restrictions were imposed individuals might exercise their freedom
privately rather than publicly, that is, by using their land as an exchange
commodity rather than as a means of preserving their political
autonomy.
By assuming away the distributional or egalitarian problem that dynamic property was meant to solve, Jefferson was able to avoid directly
confronting the dilemma. The two meanings of property, stable and dynamic, hierarchical and egalitarian, coexist in his writings. To understand why he and other eighteenth-century American republicans could
not help but avoid this problem, it is necessary to place the American
civic-republican meaning of property in the context of that culture's focus on time and history.
IV
TIME, HISTORY, AND PROPERTY
IN THE REPUBLICAN VISION

Time and history were central in the consciousness of American
lawyers during the revolutionary and early national periods. More specifically, property gained meaning to American republican lawyers from
a concern with time and an historical vision that reacted to that concern.
Like the concept of property embedded in them, American legal
writers' conceptions of time and the nation's place in history were deeply
ambivalent. On the one hand, an important part of the meaning of the
institutions they were creating was breaking away from the constraint of
the past. ' 13 Tocqueville only was reflecting a widely shared American
view when he observed that in the United States "the woof of time is
broken and the track of past generations is broken." 11 4 On the other
hand, many of the "new" legal institutions Americans had created were
largely transplants from England, including that most unrevolutionary of
institutions, the common law. Specifically with respect to the law of
property, American legal thought had to develop a vision of property
112 See J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (1962); R. McCormick & R. Tollison, Politicians, Legislation, and the
Economy: An Inquiry into the Interest-Group Theory of Government (1981).
113 See 3-4 G. White, supra note 14, at 6-10.
114 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 507 (Anchor ed. 1969).
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that reconciled the fact of revolution with both the substantial continuity
between American property law and the English common law of property and the airmation of individual property rights created by the
American revolution. Crucial questions thus emerged. How had the
American revolutionary experience altered the meaning of property so as
to distinguish American property law from its English antecedents?
Given that by the late eighteenth century the meaning of property in
English law already was linked closely with the ideology of individual
freedom, as Blackstone's Commentaries abundantly demonstrated, 11 5
what new meaning of individual autonomy did American property law
create?
The initial answers provided by American republican lawyers, including not only Jefferson but the many who wrote on the subject of
property,1 1 6 were framed largely in the form of negations. American
property law promoted a new form of autonomy because it had repudiated "feudal tyranny." "Tyranny" served as the central metaphor for
domination and hierarchy. The meanings of individual autonomy and
property and their relationship to each other were articulated in terms of
the negation of tyranny. Yet this negative articulation again allowed
republicans to avoid the critical dilemmas of individualized property
rights. If history, especially the feudal past, was a trope by which property and human liberation were signified, the symbol was effective largely
because it was amorphous. To comprehend how reliance on history
could be a move by which republican lawyers avoided confronting the
dilemmas of property and autonomy, however, one must first sketch the
understanding of history that was embedded deeply in civic-republican
legal consciousness.
A.

History in Eighteenth-CenturyAmerican Legal Consciousness

American legal writers turned to history as a, if not the, principal
source from which to create meaning for their revolution and for the new
nation. As practitioners of the eighteenth-century mentalitd of reason,
they believed that " 'the actions and affairs of men are subject to as regular and uniform laws, as other events.' "117 The sources of these laws
were reason and history. History itself was a repository of reason, a fund
from which to discern the timeless principles of law and politics. Such
principles, the revolutionaries thought, were the constituent elements of
115 See 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *2-*5.
116 See, e.g., Adams, supra note 77, reprinted in 1 Adams Papers, supra note 77, at 111;

Letter from Edmund Pendleton to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 26, 1776), reprinted in 1 Jefferson
Papers, supra note 25, at 507.
117 G. Wood, supra note 3, at 5 (quoting S. Williams, The Natural and Civil History of
Vermont xi (1794)).
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what John Adams called "the divine science of politics."""8 They would
guide Americans in their efforts to resist tyranny and protect their fundamental rights. Grounded in "reason" and discovered through history,
these principles legitimated both the rejection of English political and
legal institutions and the American institutions that replaced them.
L

The Ancient Constitution and the Common Law

Among the many paradoxes of American republican culture was the
Americans' reliance on English political and legal history as the main
source of meaning and legitimacy for their own "revolutionary" institutions.119 Eighteenth-century American Whigs saw no contradiction in
this, however, for that history was, as they interpreted it, a story of continual struggle by a people to protect their liberties against depravations
by rulers. 120 They considered their actions as constituting another chapter in the same story, an extension of the same struggle for fundamental
liberties carried on by their ancestors. But they regarded the chapter
that they were writing to be unlike those written by the English political
actors of 1215, 1628, and 1688. It was the chapter that completed the
entire story, the eschatological moment of the historical process of discovering and realizing the ancient and fundamental liberties. 21 It was
the millennial chapter to which nothing would be added later.
The notion of the "ancient constitution" was crucial in supporting
this eschatology and in avoiding contradiction and paradox in the American affirmation of the English common law. The core of that conception
was the belief that the ancient English constitution-or, as it was sometimes called to emphasize the supposed Germanic source of Saxon liber'ties, the "Gothic" constitutionl 22-transcended not only time but also
place. 123 Its integrity was not confined to any particular nation or
culture.
On the unique view of American republicans, the common law had
come to embody the promise of this ancient constitution. The American
historical narrative thus chronicled the origin of the ancient constitution
as linked to the common law early in Saxon times. The Saxons, they
believed, had developed the common law to protect certain principles of
118 J.Adams, Thoughts on Government (Philadelphia 1776), reprinted in 4 Adams Works,
supra note 46, at 193.
119 On the origins of the Whig theory of history, see J.G.A. Pocock,The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law 228-32, 255-58 (1987).
120 As Gordon Wood points out, however, a few Americans of the revolutionary generation,
James Otis in particular, were less Panglossian about the English past, seeing it as at least
occasionally in conflict with reason and the law of nature. See G. Wood, supra note 3, at 9-10.
121 See id. at 7.
122 See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *134.
123 See J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 15, at 94-97; G. Wood, supra note 3, at 10.
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liberty, and the English had asserted these principles continuously from
that time through the seventeenth century. 124 From time to time the
artifice and corruption of hierarchical tyranny had undermined the
Saxon liberties of the ancient constitution, but these lapses into corrupt
forms of authority always had proved to be unstable. Eventually the
English had purified the common law, purging it of its alien elements.
Most importantly among the foreign elements that had contaminated the
ancient common law, the Norman conquest was depicted as an aberration, not producing any change in the essential character of the common
law. 125 Robert Ferguson has summarized the role of this historical understanding of the common law and its role in the Whig ideology:
The Whig vision of history... assumed an ancient constitution, which,
through immemorial common law, guaranteed the rights of Englishmen in perpetuity. The virtues of that ancient constitution had been
undermined by the incursions and usurpations of William the Conqueror and his kingly heirs, transforming all of English history into
one long struggle for the recovery of lost liberties. In this view the
Glorious Revolution of 1688 had126been "the triumph of the Common
law and lawyers over the king."
To Americans of the eighteenth-century republican culture, then, the
common law signified a tradition of political practice of resistance
against foreign "tyranny" to protect "liberties" that were both ancient
and natural. Their efforts, by cleansing the common law of the corruptions that the English Crown and inherited aristocracy had introduced
into it, represented the culmination of this historical teleology.
The historical stories that inhabit cultures, if they are successful,
achieve the level of myth. The narrative of the common law and its connection to the ancient constitution had acquired that character well
before its telling by the American Whigs, dating back, in different versions, to the histories of Coke and Hale.1 27 But it was not a myth lacking
124 See D. Richards, Foundations of American Constitutionalism 66-67 (1989) (reverence
of Adams and Hamilton for English Constitution).
125 As Pocock points out, Norman storytelling itself aided efforts to get over the stumbling
block of the Conquest. Throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Normans had responded to complaints by dissident barons by assuring them that William the Conqueror had
confirmed "the good old law of Edward the Confessor." By the time Coke wrote his narrative
history ofthe common law, the legend of the Norman adoption of Saxon laws as their own was
thoroughly established. On this view, William, by codifying the indigenous law rather than
replacing it with his own, was no conqueror after all, thus eliminating the problem of the
Conquest being a breach of the common-law tradition. See J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 119, at
4245.
126 R. Ferguson, Law and Letters in American Culture 14 (1984).
127 See M. Hale, Consideration Touching the Amendment or Alteration of Lawes (Dublin
1787), reprinted in A Collection of Tracts Relative to the Law of England 249 (F. Hargrave
ed. 1787).
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paradox. As Coke told the story, the law that judges declare is unwritten
and immemorial, embodying the wisdom of generations gained through
experience128 -what Coke called "artificial reason." 129 The customary
nature of that law allowed it to adapt to new situations constantly.
Therein lies the source of the paradox. Adaptation suggests a historicist
conception of the common law, meaning that it comprehends that law as
historically contingent, not fundamental. But it was just Coke's mission
to affirm the timeless character of the common law to ground firmly and
finally its (and its judge-expositors') legitimate and superior authority
against the contending power of the Crown. Legitimating the political
claims of the common-law courts of his time by depicting them as continuous with the politics of the past would, within the belief-structure that
Coke inhabited, work only if that past itself was depicted as temporally
transcendental. The past as an adaptation to a particular set of circumstances is an interpretation that undermines the strategic interpretation
of timelessness. Coke successfully side-stepped these paradoxes and offered a compelling account of the common law by relying on the crucial
notion of common law as custom. "Custom" reconciles itself with the
future through adaptation, while simultaneously embracing the past as
having no identifiable source point. As custom, then, the common law
transcended the limits on legitimacy set by time by looking both toward
past and future, making it, in Selden's famous allusion, the English
Janus. 130
2. The English Transformation of the Myth of the Ancient
Constitution
American revolutionaries hardly could be expected simply to transplant the mythology of English lawyers and adopt it as their own. Nevertheless, continuity does exist between the stories of English and
American lawyers-the American telling was a variation rather than an
entirely original or indigenous myth. To some extent the change reflected in the American version itself reflected changes that had occurred
in the English telling of the story between the sixteenth and eighteenth
centuries. But the eighteenth-century version differed from its predecessor by replacing "custom" with "reason" as the source of both the coherence and legitimacy of the ancient constitution, the former having lost
intelligibility under the rise of modem ideas of sovereignty. 13 1 English
liberties were indeed ancient, but now they were grounded in reason.
128
129
130
131

See R Ferguson, supra note 126, at 30-55, 232-33.
77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343, 12 Co. Rep. 63, 65 (1608).
See J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 119, at 36 (discussing Selden's works).
See G. Wood, supra note 3, at 8-9.
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The role of history was one of confirmation, not derivation.
The other notable difference between the sixteenth- and eighteenthcentury versions of the story was the acknowledgment of feudalism and
the accommodation of the Norman conquest within the common law's
linear development. Seventeenth-century historians, in particular Sir
Henry Spelman, had made it impossible to deny that there had been a
conquest and that feudalism existed as a foreign element in the English
past. 132 But while eighteenth-century lawyers could no longer depict the
history of the common law as entirely smooth or continuous, they
could-and did-minimize the discontinuity that feudalism represented.
Of the eighteenth-century English historians who accommodated the feudal past with the common law's historical preservation of "Saxon liberty," Blackstone was especially successful in reducing the ideological
significance of the feudal past by portraying it as "a mere interruption of
' '133
the true course of the national life.
More so than any other single historical work of its time, Blackstone's Commentarieson the Laws of England was responsible for articulating the entire spectrum of symbolic vocabulary through which both
English and American lawyers interpreted the relationship between the
common law and time.134 He combined, without any sense of incompati135
bility, Coke's notion of the common law as ancient and immemorial
with Hale's theory of adaptive evolution.1 36 That is, he simultaneously
acknowledged and denied the historicist character of the common law.
Moreover, his historical vision oscillated between two incompatible theories of historical development, one cyclical, the other linear. Like Hale
but unlike Coke, he acknowledged the reality of the common law's feudal
past but resolved the problem it created for common-law mythology in
contradictory ways. Describing the common law's "successive mutations
at different periods of time,"13 7 he portrayed the common law as having
come full circle to reattain its original state of purity with the final stage
constituting "the complete restitution of English liberty, for the first
time, since its total abolition at the conquest." 138 At the same time,
chapter thirty-three of the Commentaries, entitled "Of the Rise, Progress, and Gradual Improvements, of the Laws of England," chronicles
the story of the linear progress of the common law from its relatively
despotic origins, with each successive stage representing improvement in
See J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 119, at 91-123.
Id. at 244.
See L. Friedman, supra note 90, at 112.
135See, e.g., I W. Blackstone, Commentaries *5, *17; 4 id. at *413.
136 1 id. at *5.
137 4 id. at *400.
138 Id. at *431.
132
133
134
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the condition of English liberty.139 The linear metaphor also stressed
that modem England exemplified the commercial stage in social, legal,
and political development, a stage whose superiority over all prior history is indicated by its simplicity and refinement.14o
What was consistent in these two versions was the figurative use of
feudalism. The Commentariesdeveloped feudalism into a symbol for the
idea that departures from English liberty were only aberrational corruptions. That theme was signified forceflly by Blackstone's repeated opposition between "servility" and "liberty." 1 4 ' One of the ironies of the
historical rendering of the common law during the late eighteenth century is that the Blackstonian symbology closely paralleled the tropes of
American political and legal discourse, in particular the opposition between "feudalism" and "liberty,"' 142 even while the English and American symbol-systems signified conflicting political objectives. No single
American text of that time illustrates this irony more emphatically than
John Adams's famous essay, A Dissertationon the Canonand the Feudal
Law. 14 3 Written at about the same time as the Commentaries, the Dissertation chronicled essentially the same historical tale as did Blackstone's
work. Yet, while Blackstone's message was a confirmation of the rationality and justice of the extant English regime, Adams's was precisely the
opposite.
3.

The HistoricalSymbology of Tyranny in the American Legal
Imagination:Adams's Dissertation

To the modem reader, Adams's Dissertationappears odd in several
respects. Why would an American republican lawyer, writing political
tracts for newspapers to argue the case for revolution, be interested in the
canon law of the Roman Catholic Church or the English feudal law of
centuries past? For that matter, why would anyone in the late eighteenth
century bother to juxtapose canon law with feudal law? The sense of
See id. at *407-*43.
Blackstone's contradictory eclecticism, strategically deployed in the interest of rationalizing the existing social and legal order, also is indicated by the fact that while he borrowed the
idea of linear social and legal evolution, ending with the commercial order, from Scottish
social historians like Hume, Lord Karnes, and John Robertson, he perpetuated myths of traditional English legal historiography that the Scottish historians had completely discredited. See
Lieberman, The Legal Needs of a Commercial Society: The Jurisprudence of Lord Karnes, in
Wealth & Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment 203, 207
(I. Hont & M. Ignatieff eds. 1983). For detailed discussion of the Scottish theory of linear
social development, see text accompanying notes 196-227 infra.
141 See, e.g., 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *74-*100, *287-*90; 4 id. at *420.
142 Blackstone himself became an object of the paradoxical character of the civic-republican
legal culture: while a symbol of all that was despised about England, he was the source of legal
education for that entire generation of American lawyers.
143 See Adams, supra note 77, reprinted in 1 Adams Papers, supra note 77, at 103.
139
140
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oddness disappears, however, if one recognizes Adams's use of the topics
as figurative rather than literal. Feudal law and canon law were symbols
for different civil and ecclesiastical forms of tyranny that were ripe for
overthrow in the American republic. They were symbols of a past that
was to be transcended.
"Since the promulgation of christianity," Adams began, "the two
144
greatest systems of tyranny... are the cannon and the feudal law."
The former was "framed by the Romish clergy for the aggrandisement of
their own order," while the latter was "originally, a code of laws, for a
vast army, in a perpetual encampment." 1 45 Adams continued that the
"grandees" of the two systems were in "confederacy" and that "as long
as this confederacy lasted, and the people were held in ignorance, Liberty, and with her, Knowledge, and Virtue too, seem to have deserted the
earth.... [T]he struggle between the people and the confederacy" began
with the Reformation. 146 Adams defined that struggle in terms of the
opposition of liberty, knowledge, and virtue against tyranny, ignorance,
and corruption. That opposition was the basis for nothing less than the
meaning of America itself. "It was this great struggle, that peopled
America. It was not religion alone, as is commonly supposed; but it was
a love of universalLiberty, and an hatred, a dread, an horror of the infernal confederacy... that projected, conducted, and accomplished the settlement of America." 147
Adams is defining here the teleology of America, a teleology that is
eschatological. For the American experience is seen as a singular moment in history, the point in time toward which all other moments have
aimed but never reached. It is not a matter of returning to some ancient
constitution that temporarily had been corrupted. Rather the vision is
linear and progressive. The very reason for America's existence as a nation was to establish liberty as the victor over tyranny finally and conclusively. Because it had been created without a feudal past and without an
48
ecclesiastical government, it had succeeded where no other nation had.
Adams's America was the epiphany of liberty, and what made that experience possible was America's escape from the past, its victory over time.
From this transcendental perspective, then, it was possible to see the
English common law as foreign-indeed hostile-to American law, not
Id. (emphasis in original), reprinted in 1 Adams Papers, supra note 77, at 112.
Id. (emphasis in original), reprinted in I Adams Papers, supra note 77, at 112-13.
Id., reprinted in 1 Adams Papers, supra note 77, at 113.
Id. (emphasis in original), reprinted in I Adams Papers, supra note 77, at 113-14.
As Pocock has noted, there is a sense in which Adams's eighteenth-century whiggism,
depicting America as a nation destined to be liberal, anticipated the twentieth-century whig
historiography of Louis Hartz. Both were asserting what Pocock has called "the premise of
inescapable liberalism." See Pocock, Between Gog and Magog: The Republican Thesis and
the Ideologia Americana, 48 J. Hist. Ideas 325, 338 (1987).
144

145
146
147
148
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as its "parent," with all of the sense of authority and greater wisdom that
that image would imply.
But while the American political and legal regime might be unique
in history, its success-the ultimate success of liberty over tyranny-was
not guaranteed. Liberty was not self-executing. The feudal and canon
law remained a threat to the American system's status as the culmination
of the historical struggle:
There seems to be a direct and formal design on foot, to enslave all
America. This however must be done by degrees. The first step that is
intended seems to be an entire subversion of the whole system of our
Fathers, by an introduction of the cannon and feudal law, into
America. The cannon and feudal systems tho' greatly mutilated in
England, are not yet destroy'd. Like the temples and palaces, in which
the great contrivers of them, once worship'd and inhabited, they exist
in ruins; and much of the domineering spirit of them still remains. 14 9
It was necessary, therefore, for Americans to undertake positive steps to
assure that the canon and feudal laws acquired no foothold here.
The law of property was clearly a part of this project. Although the
Dissertationis not explicit on this point, it does recognize property's role
in resisting feudal intrusions by emphasizing a distinction basic to the
figurative vocabulary of English and American eighteenth-century common-law historiography. That distinction was between "feudal" and "allodial" land, that is, land "held" by one who occupied a subordinated
position in a hierarchy of ownership versus land autonomously "owned"
by a person free of hierarchical entanglements.15 0 The distinction
marked the translation of the Whig distinction between "servility" and
"liberty" 1 51 into the context of land ownership. The association between
the feudal regime, in particular feudal property, and personal dependence
was so strong in American republican legal discourse that merely to
characterize something as "feudal" itself was sufficient to indicate
52
condemnation.1
Adams did not assert that land ownership in America had always
been allodial. Given the colonies' origins in royal charters, he could
hardly do so. Yet he still denied that feudal property had ever existed
here. He explained this historically unique tertium quid:
To have holden their lands, allodially, or for every man to have been
the sovereign lord and proprietor of the ground he occupied, would
149 Adams, supra note 77, reprinted in 1 Adams Papers, supra note 77, at 127.
150 See 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *57-*100, *287-*90, *463; 4 id. at *420.
151 See 2 id. at *57-*100, *287-*90, *463; 4 id. at *420.
152 That the term "feudal" connoted tyranny was neither unique to American thought nor
uniquely republican. It had the same meaning in Scottish Enlightenment writing and in English Whig texts as well, as Kames and Blackstone clearly illustrate. On the former, see Lieberman, supra note 140, at 216; on the latter, see 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries S419-*20.
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have constituted a government, too nearly like a commonwealth. They
[the Puritans] were contented therefore to hold their lands of their
King, as their sovereign Lord, and to him they were willing to render
homage: but to no mesne and subordinate Lords.... In all this, they
were so strenuous, that they have even transmitted to their posterity, a
very general contempt and detestation of holdings 153
by quit rents: As
they have also an hereditary ardor for liberty ....
Here again, Adams metaphorically communicated the correlative
messages of America's escape from time and its destiny with liberty. In a
view that prefigured Louis Hartz's now-rejected view that America was
born liberal, 154 Adams maintained the myth that, from the very outset of
their experience, Americans had escaped the past, which was associated
with "feudal" tyranny and corruption. The original regime of property
in America had illustrated this unique achievement.
To American republican lawyers like Adams, then, feudalism and
feudal property were the dominant symbols for the past that was rejected
or, rather, transcended. But what was the alternative that American
republicans were affirming? The symbolic opposite of feudal property
was "allodial" land. Why was this seemingly technical and obsolete concept from the English common law meaningful to American republican
lawyers? What did it signify to them? We gain an appreciation for the
import of the concept of allodial land and some idea of its symbolic function from Jefferson's widely circulated pamphlet, A Summary View of the
Rights of British Ameica.Is5
4.

The Dialectic of Allodial vs. FeudalLand

Intended to justify colonial complaints against English tyrannical
practices, A Summary View also set out Jefferson's historical understanding of the development of the common law regarding property. That
understanding by and large followed the American variation on the English myth that Blackstone and others had popularized 56 but with one
important change. Unlike Adams, Jefferson did not deny that feudal
property had ever been introduced into the American colonies. Instead,
he argued that its introduction "at a very early period of our settlement"
had been "an error in the nature of our landholdings. 1' 57 The histori153 Adams, supra note 77, reprinted in 1 Adams Papers, supra note 77, at 118. Quit rent
was a rent paid in lieu of a required feudal service. On the use of quit rent in the American
land system, see generally B. Bond, The Quit-Rent System in the American Colonies (1919).
154 See L. Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Poltical Thought Since the Revolution (1955).
155 T. Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British America (1774), reprinted in 1
Jefferson Papers, supra note 25, at 121.
156 See text accompanying notes 130-55 supra.
157 T. Jefferson, supra note 155, reprinted in 1 Jefferson Papers, supra note 25, at 132.
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cally accurate account, Jefferson contended, was that the general rule of
the common law even after the conquest was the Saxon regime of "allodial" land, held "in absolute dominion, disencumbered with any superior.' ' 158 Feudal tenures were "but exceptions out of the Saxon laws of
possession,"

159

and the latter "still form the basis or groundwork of the

Common law, to prevail wheresoever the exceptions have not taken
place." 16° But why had not those exceptions correctly become part of
colonial law, and why were feudal tenures nevertheless in fact introduced
here? In a truly ingenious move, Jefferson simultaneously resolved both
paradoxes and laid the historical foundation for colonial claims against
the crown:
America was not conquered by William the Norman, nor it's [sic]
lands surrendered to him or any of his successors. Possessions there
are undoubtedly of the Allodial nature. Our ancestors however, who
migrated hither, were laborers, not lawyers. The fictitious principle
that all lands belong originally to the king, they were early persuaded
to believe real, and accordingly took grants of their own lands from the
crown. And while the crown continued to grant for small sums and on
reasonable rents, there was no inducement to arrest the error and lay it
open to public view. But his majesty has lately taken on him to advance the terms of purchase and of holding to the double of what they
were, by which means the acquisition of lands being rendered difficult,
the population of our country is likely to be checked. It is time therefore for us ... to declare that he has no right to grant lands of
himself.161
Jefferson further developed the idea of allodial land in an exchange
of correspondence with Edmund Pendleton two years after the publication of A Summary View. His discussion here reveals the central symbolic function of the concept of allodial property. That function was to
signify the role of property in realizing the republican vision of individual
autonomy.
In a letter to Pendleton, 162 Jefferson made two proposals regarding
the disposition of Virginia land. He urged first that all Virginia land,
including land already held by individuals who owed tenurial obligations
to the state, should be allodial in character. 163 The immediate and obvi158 Id.

Id., reprinted in 1 Jefferson Papers, supra note 25, at 133.
160 Id.
161 Id. The act doubling the quit rent, to which Jefferson referred, was the Land Ordinance
of 1774. See Lewis, Jefferson and Virginia's Pioneers, 1774-1781, 34 Miss. Valley Hist. Rev.
551, 552 (1948).
162 See Letter from Edmund Pendleton to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 3, 1776), reprinted in 1
Jefferson Papers, supra note 25, at 484.
163 See id.
159
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ous effect of purging land of this vestige of feudal land law would have
been to wipe out the remaining tenurial obligations that landholders
owed to the state. A less obvious, but to Jefferson equally important
effect would have been to replace symbolically hierarchical landholding
with autonomous landownership.
His second proposal was that the government should sell all unsettled lands, which it owned, in fee simple. 164 By the end of the eighteenth
century, the general view behind this proposal became the land policy of
the federal government and some municipalities as well. The Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, for example, can be understood as implementing the
Jeffersonian land policy. 165 Similarly, New York City embarked on a
program disposing of its public land in Manhattan through unrestricted
1 66
grants in fee-simple absolute.
Responding to these two proposals, Pendleton was frank: "I have
[been] beating my brain about your old Opinion that our Land tenure
should be merely Allodial, and a New Opinion frequently mentioned
during the last convention, that the unappropriated Lands should all be
sold for the benefit of the commonwealth."' 1 67 Pendleton raised two objections to both proposals. First, by changing the terms of the original
Virginia charter (which had entitled every newly arrived settler to fifty
acres of land to be held in so-called "socage" tenure in exchange for the
annual payment of a modest fee, known as quit rent) 168 both proposals
unfairly would put new settlers in a comparatively better position than
existing settlers.1 6 9 Second, Jefferson's plan would disadvantage the
poor, "who would not be able to bid against the others [that is, the 'men
1 70
of property']" for the unappropriated land.
In response to these criticisms, Jefferson reiterated his historical theory that the English common law which had been transplanted to the
164 See id.
165 See Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 51. On the federal land policy of
placing public land in private hands, see generally P. Gates, History of Public Land Law
Development 121-494 (1968).
166 See H. Hartog, Public Property and Private Power: The Corporation of the City of New
York in American Law, 1730-1870, at 108-15 (1983).
167 Letter from Edmund Pendleton to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 3, 1776), reprinted in 1 Jefferson Papers, supra note 25, at 484.
168 Socage, the only tenure encountered in early modem English and American land law
that had any real importance, was the residual category of tenure. A socage tenant held land
under an obligation either to perform certain services for the lord or to pay to the lord a fixed
sum of money. See A. Simpson, A History of the Land Law 11-13 (2d ed. 1986). By Jefferson's time, the tenant in socage was treated the same as a freeholder. Yet, while the socagefarmer was owner in all but name, the fact remained that it was tenure under which the land
was held. For republicans, this had enormous symbolic value.
169 See Letter from Edmund Pendleton to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 3, 1776), reprinted in 1
Jefferson Papers, supra note 25, at 484.
170 Id.
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colonies, when correctly understood, provided for allodial ownership.
Whether any American land may have been converted into feudal land
by legislation or by the terms of grants was a matter of speculation, but
even if any land had been so changed "we have it in our power to make it
what it ought to be for the public good." 171 Jefferson left little doubt
which regime of ownership he considered as comporting with the public
good:
[W]as not the separation of the property from the perpetual use of
lands a mere fiction? Is not it's [sic] history well known, and the purpose for which it was introduced, to wit, the establishment of a military system of defence? Was it not afterwards made an engine of
immense oppression? Is it wanting with us for the purpose of military
defence? May not it's [sic] other legal effects... be performed in other
more simple ways? Has it not been the practice of all other nations to
hold their lands as their personal estate in absolute dominion? Are we
not the better for what we have hitherto abolished of the feudal system? Has not every restitution of the antient [sic] Saxon laws had
happy effects? Is it not better now that we return at once into that
yet
happy system of our ancestors, the wisest and most perfect ever
172
devised by the wit of man, as it stood before the 8th century?
The effect of Jefferson's historical chronicle was much the same as
Adams's. Both strongly affirmed the themes of America as breaking
with the past and the historical priority of "allodial" over "feudal" property in America. Feudal property signified "tyranny" and the corruption
of "virtue," which in turn was understood in terms of the question of
hierarchical social relationships. Allodial land signified "liberty" and
"virtue." Each chronicle was structured by a dialectic in which "feudal"
and "allodial" land were symbols for opposing political, social, and legal
ideals:
feudal property vs. allodial property;
corruption vs. virtue;
wealth vs. liberty;
privilege (hierarchy) vs. equality;
personal dependency vs. personal autonomy.
But this dialectic obscured important ambiguities. The positive
meaning of "allodial" property was less clear than its negative meaning:
the rejection of formal social hierarchies and personal dependency. If
allodial property signified personal autonomy and equality, or at least a
nonhierarchical society, did that imply anything like a commitment to
radical egalitarianism in the distribution of land or even abandonment of
171 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton (Aug. 13, 1776), reprinted in I
Jefferson Papers, supra note 25, at 491-92.
172 Id., reprinted in 1 Jefferson Papers, supra note 25, at 492.
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the common-law conception of privatized ownership?173 Adams did not
address these matters in his Dissertation itself, but his "Fragmentary
Notes" for it offer a partial response. He wrote: "Property monopolized
or in the Possession of a few is a Curse to Mankind. We should preserve
not an Absolute Equality-this is unnecessary, but preserve all from extreme Poverty, and all others from extravagant Riches." 174 While Adams's views later would become clearer, they were initially vague and illdefined.1 75 Jefferson's views on the distribution of land and on the configuration of property rights were similarly fraught with ambiguity. 176 In
his correspondence with Pendleton, at least, Jefferson made clear that he
contemplated distribution of small parcels of land to all settlers, not by
selling unappropriated land but merely by allowing settlers to do what
they were bound to do anyway, that is, appropriate the western lands.1 77
More important for present purposes was the remaining uncertainty
about the character of property. Did allodial property imply an embrace
of dynamic property as a means of eliminating the material basis for a
possible American re-creation of formal hierarchies? American republicans, including the most conspicuously "agrarian" among them, i.e., Jefferson, were deeply ambivalent about the character that property ought
to take, producing a dialectic in eighteenth-century American legal discourse between dynamic and stable property.
Yet the source of that anxiety was not a concern for feudal property
nor the hierarchies its tenures and entails generated. Rather the concern
was over commercial, or more accurately, commodified property. The
republican culture associated commodified property with a modem form
of personal dependency that created social as well as economic hierarchies to replace the old "feudal" hierarchies. What is striking about the
discourse of property in terms of a dichotomy between "feudal" and "allodial" property then is that it coexisted with, yet was completely isolated from, discourse about the dangers of commodified property.
There are in fact, then, three, not two, forms of property in the symbology of American civic republicanism-"feudal," "allodial," and
"commerial"17 8-and two dichotomies, not one--"feudal vs. allodial"
173One meaning that allodial land unambiguously did not have was that women ought, to
be autonomous landholders. Even the most egalitarian versions of land policy simply assumed
the dependency of women on the farm.
174 Adams, supra note 77, reprinted in 1 Adams Papers, supra note 77, at 106.
175 See text accompanying notes 82-84, 152-53 supra.
176 See text accompanying notes 156-70 supra.
177 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton (Aug. 13, 1776), reprinted in 1
Jefferson Papers, supra note 25, at 492.
178 Eighteenth-century discourse used the term "commercial" to refer to what modems call
"commodified." The term subsumes the agriculture/manufacturing dichotomy that preoccupied Jefferson. Jefferson acknowledged the need for commerce as such. What he feared was
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and "feudal vs. commercial." Each form signified a particular mode of
social life. These modes of social life, moreover, were understood historically. That is, each occupied a position within a temporal line, a stage of
social development.
To say that American civic-republican lawyers arranged these
modes of social life historically does not indicate, however, what their
historical arrangement was. Two different arrangements of history were
available in eighteenth-century Anglo-American historiography, cyclical
and linear, and the two could be confused, leading in some instances to
an inconclusive oscillation between the two. For American republicans,
this inconclusiveness was not simply the result of sloppiness or inattention. Rather it signalled a deep anxiety about commerce, specifically its
attendant changes on the form of property, and an ambivalence about
social change in the new republic.
B.
L

HistoricizingProperty:Predicamentand Responses

The Predicament of Time and Republican Property

One might say that republican time added a historical dimension to
the dialectic of stability and change in property. The same dialectic between stability and change, which posed a seemingly intractable question
of political theory-how to regulate land ownership to avoid both hierarchy and commercialization-also emerged as a problem of history; of
how to leave the past while avoiding a particular version of the future. In
relation to the past, time posed one problem: the existence of feudal
property in the common law, which represented personal dependency.
That threat to the republican vision led to the related calls for a break
with the past and a dynamic of property that would prevent the re-creation of feudal hierarchies. It is from this point of view that American
property lawyers could regard, as crucially important, legislative reforms
that effected little practical change, especially the abolition of entailments
179
and primogeniture.
In relation to the future, however, time posed another problem: the
loss of stability, without which virtue could not be maintained, brought
about by the rise of commodified property. J.G.A. Pocock has established the important role of public credit, whose growth was part of the
so-called Financial Revolution of the first half of the eighteenth century,180 in the emergence of intangible and highly mobile forms of wealth
an economy in which manufacturing replaced agriculture as the dominant activity and in
which land itself became a mere market commodity, to be bought and sold for personal profit.
179 See text accompanying notes 86-106 supra.
180 On the Financial Revolution, see generally P. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in
England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit, 1688-1756 (1967).
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as property. 1 ' The "new property" of the eighteenth century-marketable shares of public debt 82 -was unlike the paradigmatic form of property not only in its intangibility but in the popular perception that its
character as property depended upon its exchangibility. Land, of course,
had long been subject to exchange, but enough of its mystique as anchoring social (and political) relations remained in eighteenth-century English understandings to have prevented it from being treated as a
commodity. Marketable interests in public debt were altogether a different matter. Their fluidity helped to create an understanding in popular
thought of other forms of property, including land,18 3 as dynamic, and
that understanding, in turn, affected the legal idea of property, pushing it
toward the status of commodity. Courts in both England and, later, the
United States gradually came to regard property interests as protectible
because of their value as determined by exchange. 184
Faced with corruption when it looked to the past and uncertain
about a future in which the corrupting forces of manufacturing and cornmodification might be victorious, American civic republicans hardly
could avoid experiencing a sense of anxiety. "Here," as Pocock has reminded us, "are the origins of American historical pessimism."''8 5
2. Responses to Historicism
One way to circumvent the temporal aspect of the predicament of
republican property would have been simply to deny the identification of
time with change and contingency. This was precisely the thrust of the
old common-law mentalit6 articulated through the understanding of the
common law either as the ancient, or "Gothic," constitution or as em181See J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 4, at 423-61.
182 On the rise of "imaginary" forms of property in the eighteenth century, see text accompanying notes 247-58 infra.
183 One indication of the commodification of land in popular American consciousness by
the mid-nineteenth century is the failure of the Homestead Act to have its desired effect of
using land to anchor populations in the American West. As several supporters of the Act had
predicted, the failure to impose restrictions upon the land's alienability meant that a large
number of "homesteaders" used the land to engage in speculation. See H. Smith, supra note

49, at 189-94.
184 See Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the
Modem Concept of Property, 29 Buffalo L. Rev. 325 (1980); cf. M. Horwitz, supra note 2, at
31-62 (transformation in conception of property).

185 Pocock, Civic Humanism and Its Role in Anglo-American Thought, in Politics, Language and Time 80, 100 (J.G.A. Pocock ed. 1973). For Jeffersonians, anxiety about the future

stemmed from their recognition that the "safety valve" of Western land-the crucial feature
differentiating America from those European countries whose limited space tied their citizens
to lives of manufacturing-might close eventually. In this sense, the myth of the garden provided the seeds for its own demise. Signalling the West's demise as a symbol, of course, was

the achievement of Frederick Jackson Turner. See H. Smith, supra note 49, at 206.
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bodying the principles of an immanent natural and timeless order.18 6
The central claim of this view was that the common law and all of its
associated institutions, property being the most important among them,
was not contingent but essentially had remained constant through
time. 18 7 In the American context, such a view would have allowed
republicans to claim, rather abstractly, that American property relations
would balance conflicting interests because they would reflect the natural
order of things.
However, increasingly sophisticated critiques of historicist chroniclers of the common law's feudal past eroded the static conception of the
common law, indeed, of all social institutions. By the second half of the
eighteenth century, that conception largely had disappeared in English
and colonial American legal writing." 8 This disappearance helps explain
why denial was not an available response to the predicament of time for
republican lawyers. While many legal writers did continue to discuss the
ancient constitution, that reference was no more than a "fragmented survival,"1 8 9 that is, a rhetoric whose original meaning had lost virtually all
of its original coherence.
Denial of contingency as a consequence of time, then, was not readily available to well-read American legal writers in the late eighteenth
century. The public meaning of time had changed from continuity to
contingency. Indeed, American lawyers had inherited from English
civic-humanist sources extending back to Harrington1 9° a public meaning
of time that unambiguously acknowledged the inevitability of change in
all societies. That meaning was expressed in a theory of social development that portrayed societies as organic and developmental, rather than
mechanistic and static. 19 1 To articulate the pattern of social development civic republicans turned again to metaphor, interpreting society in
terms of what they believed they best understood, themselves. As
humans developed, they reasoned, so did societies. The pattern of
human and social change was one of birth, growth, decay, and death.
Individual societies, like individual humans, did not develop continuously in a linear direction. They flourished for a time but eventually
186 See J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 119, at 255-80.
187 The method of classifying conceptual frameworks, or what I call "public meanings,"
around contingency and continuity as responses to time in public consciousness is developed

by J.G.A. Pocock in his highly suggestive essay, Modes of Political and Historical Time in
Early Eighteenth-Century England (1976), reprinted in J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 15, at 91.
188 See text accompanying notes 185-87 supra.
189 Both the term "fragmented survival" and the meaning to which I am assigning it appear
in A. MacIntyre, After Virtue 110-13, 257 (2d ed. 1984).
190 On the English civic-humanist theory of history, see J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 4.

191 See G. Wood, supra note 3, at 29.
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deteriorated. 192
The consequence of this cyclical theory for republicans was deeply
troubling. It implied that even the virtuous polity gradually decayed as
society passed through a cyclical series of changes. The actual histories
of past republics, of which eighteenth-century American republicans

were well aware, reinforced this message. The republics of Sparta and
Rome, as well as those of Renaissance Italy, not only had failed to elude
change but had passed through the cycle of decay precisely as the theory

posited.
Moving from the macro to the micro level, from entire societies to
particular institutions, the message was equally worrisome. Property, as
the foundation of society and personality, was at the center of this cycle
of change. In all known societies, property had changed form over time,
originating in a natural state in which ownership anchored personal autonomy but thereafter transforming into increasingly corrupt forms that
replaced autonomy with dependence and hierarchy.
It is just this matrix of historical change that explains both the
prominence and the ambiguous meanings of the dichotomy between allodial and feudal land. For the cyclical theory of social change, as well as
the sociology of property, was simultaneously the source of optimism
and pessimism. Indeed, what emerges perhaps most clearly from the discussions of the allodial/feudal dichotomy is a dialectic of optimism and
pessimism which is built into the very image of the cycle. While that
image encouraged the notion of the restoration of "Saxon liberty" associated with allodial land by abolishing all vestiges of feudal property
(again, the movement to eliminate the entail and primogeniture looms
large here), the logic of the cycle dictated that forms of property and
society that are marked by a high degree of personal autonomy eventually must succumb to decay and dependence. With the experience of
European nations, whose economies already had been transformed by
manufacturing, credit, and the rise of mobile and intangible forms of
property, serving as examples of how the seemingly inexorable logic of
social change produced dependence and corruption, Americans could
well wonder whether they could escape the same fate.
One response to this predicament that republican American lawyers
made was to assert, with more hope than conviction, an escape from history. In other words, if neither Jefferson nor Adams denied change
wrought by time as did Coke, it equally is true that neither confronted it
directly. 193 In fact, both Jefferson and Adams shared with virtually all
192 On this cyclical theory of social change, see id. at 28-30; Persons, The Cyclical Theory of
History in Eighteenth Century America, 6 Am. Q. 147 (1954).
193 Adams's response to time differed from Jefferson's in yet another respect. Adams was
drawing on the Christian millennialist tradition to define a relationship between the new
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American republicans, indeed all Americans at that time, a deep-seated
belief in the historical uniqueness of the new society and its institutions.
For Adams, the historical novelty was that America and all of its social
institutions were created free from the taint of the old world, the world of
the feudal and the canon laws, from the very outset. American law was
unique in never having been part of the ancien rigime. Jefferson's response, articulated repeatedly from A Summary View through Notes on
the State of Virginia and later correspondences, expressed the hope that
America's generous frontier would allow it to escape history. To Jeffer1 94 seemed to
son, the unique conditions of the American experience
make it possible to redefine the pattern of historical development and to
break the cycle in which decay, corruption, and dependence ultimately
prevailed. Societies, Jefferson claimed, resorted to manufacturing only
by reason of necessity. The vast expanse of land in America held out the
promise, for the first time in known history, of breaking the historical
authority of necessity.
But this was no more than a hope. Jefferson was well aware that the
uniqueness of the American experience might only be temporary, reducing it to a "Rousseauean moment." 195 The land eventually would all be
settled, and the safety valve closed. At that moment-the "Machiavellian moment" when time, secularly understood, confronts virtue and personal autonomy-the cycle must resume and "allodial" property must
give way to "feudal" property, autonomy to dependency and hierarchy.
C.

The Embrace of Modernity: The Scottish Historical Thesis and
the Transformation of Property,Liberty, and Time in
American Republicanism

Although Jefferson and Adams did not avail themselves of it, there
was another response to the predicament that history posed for society in
general and property in particular. This response was developed by
eighteenth-century Scottish social theorists, including David Hume,
American society and time. It was that tradition that underlay Adams's vision of America as
escaping secular time. America was the millennium realized, and with its arrival America was
the culmination of secular history. Jefferson's understanding of time, by contrast, was secular,
not sacred; his religious skepticism made the Christian millennium idea unacceptable to him.
Lacking a sacred understanding of time, in turn, meant that Jefferson could not understand
America's relationship to time as escaping secular history. On the role of the Christian millennialist conception of time in late eighteenth-century American thought, see R. Bloch, Visionary Republic: Millenialist Themes in American Thought, 1756-1800 (1985); Kloppenberg, The
Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political
Discourse, 74 J.Am. Hist. 9 (1987).
194 See generally L. Marx, supra note 52; H. Smith, supra note 49; E. Tuveson, Redeemer
Nation: The Idea of America's Millennial Role (1968).
195 See J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 4, at 541.
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Adam Smith, John Millar, Adam Ferguson, William Robertson, and,
most significantly for lawyers, Lord Kames. 19 6 The central achievement
of these Scottish Enlightenment social theorists was to develop an interpretation of commerce and its effect on society that was an alternative to
the civic-humanist interpretation found, for example, in Harrington, that
saw commerce as marking a cyclical descent toward decay. If the ultimate message of the latter interpretation was pessimism about time and
commerce, Scottish social theory had a quite different trajectory, one
that encouraged optimism about the future and effects of social change,
particularly about the rise of commercial society.
L

From Politics to Society

The two interpretations differ most importantly over what they emphasized as the fundamental object of historical study. While civic humanism focused on the benefits and vices of various kinds of political
institutions-monarchical, aristocratic, democratic, etc.-the Scottish interpretation shifted attention to forms of society-agricultural, feudal,

commercial. 197 This shift from the political to the social is reflected most

obviously in the difference between the categories of their historical ty-

pologies. Civic-republican thought tended to chart historical change as a
movement through monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, and republic. 198
In contrast, the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers were concerned cen196 On Kames's contribution to the legal aspects of Scottish historical theory, see I. Ross,
Lord Karnes and the Scotland of His Day 8-43 (1972); Lieberman, supra note 104, at 203;
Lehmann, The Historical Approach in the Juridical Writings of Lord Kames, 9 Jurid. Rev.
(n.s.) 17 (1964); Stein, The General Notions of Contract and Property in Eighteenth-Century
Scottish Thought, 8 Jurid. Rev. (n.s.) 1 (1963). As Henry May has noted, it was Kames who
had the greatest influence on the legal writers in the American civic-republican tradition. See
H. May, The Enlightenment in America 337-58 (1976). Even those historians who have cautioned (correctly) against reading too much Scottish influence into late eighteenth-century
American political thought have conceded Kames's influence on American writers, particularly those who were trained as lawyers. See Hamowy, Jefferson and the Scottish Enlightenment: A Critique of Garry Wills' InventingAmerica: Jefferson's Declarationof Independence,
36 Win. & Mary Q. 503, 521 (1979).
197 See G. Bryson, Man and Society: The Scottish Inquiry of the Eighteenth Century 148-73
(1945); R. Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage 99-131 (1976); Pocock, Cambridge
Paradigms and Scotch Philosophers: A Study of the Relations between the Civic Humanist
and Civil Jurisprudential Interpretation of Eighteenth-Century Social Thought, in Wealth &
Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment 235, 240 (. Hont &
M. Ignatieff eds. 1983). The project of developing a science of society comparable to Baconian
natural science was the work not only of those contributors to the Scottish Enlightenment
whose approach to the study of society was historical and comparative (Ferguson, Millar,
Smith, and Kames) but also of the part of the Scottish circle known as the "Common Sense"
school, led by Thomas Reid, whose central concern was to repudiate Humean skepticism. See
generally S. Conrad, Citizenship and Common Sense: The Problem of Authority in the Social
Background and Social Philosophy of the Wise Club of Aberdeen (1987).
198 See N. Machiavelli, The Discourses (L. Walker trans. 1970) (n.p. 1519).
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trally with comparing feudal and commercial society. Moreover, this
analysis took place within an historical time-line whose categorieshunting, pastoral, agriculture, and commercial-are all categories whose
public meaning was social and economic rather than political.
Focusing on this shift from the political to the social risks distorted
the extent to which the civic republican and Scottish Enlightenment interpretations of time differed. The two understandings, in fact, were
locked together in various and complicated ways. For one thing, the
Scottish writers did not understand their work as constituting a rhetoric
that competed with the rhetoric of civic humanism. If Scottish historical
social theory was a theory of civil, as distinguished from civic, humanism,
it nevertheless was consistent with civic republicanism to the extent that
it was, above all, a theory of humanism. Both interpretations shared an
overriding concern with the human personality. Civic republicans and
Scottish social theorists differed over which aspect of that personality
should be emphasized, political or social, or, more accurately, over the
meaning of the human personality, not over the paramount importance
of the nature of human personality. 199 Moreover, Hume, Smith, Ferguson, Robertson, and Kames all shared with civic republicans the understanding of time as change. Insisting that the study of history and
society must be scientific and adhering to the historiographical advances
made in the preceding century by Spelman and Hale,20° the Scottish historical writers were hardly more likely than Harringtonian civic republicans to reject the insights gained in the preceding century by the critics of
the ancient constitution myth.
What separated the two paradigms was each one's response to the
understanding of historical change over time. This difference was inextricably related to the two schools' difference over the nature of personality. The effect of, if not the incentive for, shifting attention from the
political to the social was to make it possible to welcome social change in
general and commercial culture and commercial values in particular. To
see why this is so, the theory of social development to which virtually
every writer associated with the social-historical-comparative branch of
the Scottish Enlightenment subscribed, the so-called "four-stages" theory, must be considered.
2.

The "Four-Stages"Theory
Inspired by the example of Montesquieu's study of legal change in

199 The reasons for the difference between the Scottish and civic-humanist interpretations of
humanity are the subject of debate. For a sketch of some possibilities, see Pocock, supra note
197, at 246-52.
200 See J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 119, at 91-123.
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The Spirit of Laws,20 1 scholars in Scotland and France, whose civil law
system greatly influenced Scottish social theorists, 20 2 looked for what
Montesquieu had not fully provided: a model of legal change, applicable
to all societies, from primitive origins to full maturity. Both groups articulated the theory that societies progress through four stages, hunting,
2 4
pastoral, agricultural, and commercial, 20 3 apparently simultaneously. 0
One of the most significant themes of this progressive theory was the
linkage between property regimes, division of labor, and social wealth. A
society's division of labor was seen as both a consequence and a determinant of the system of property. According to the dominant version of the
story, 205 especially that told by its less sophisticated chroniclers, 2° 6 in the
early stages of social development, labor tasks were simple because the
forms of, and rights in, property were rudimentary, and the rudimentary
regime of property, in turn, created no need for a greater division of labor. For a variety of reasons (which sometimes were articulated weakly,
if at all)20 7 more complex forms of property and more complex property
rights emerged. Private ownership of land, for example, accompanied
the third, agricultural stage, at least according to Adam Smith.20 8 By the
time the final stage, commercial society, was reached, a substantial division of labor existed. Significantly, that stage was marked by a profound
increase in the aggregate amount of social wealth. 209
The Scottish writers regarded their history as scientific, or as they
called it, "philosophical," in the sense that it purported to describe an
immutable pattern of social development, but they hardly were unbiased
about the story they told. They depicted their social transformation as
the development of "civilization." "Civilization" was later, especially in
the nineteenth century, to become "progress," but it had much the same
meaning in the late eighteenth century. All of the contributors to this
story left no doubt that each stage represented a progressively higher
C. Secondat [Baron de Montesquieu], supra note 71.
See Pocock, supra note 197, at 276.
See generally R. Meek, supra note 197. The principal French contributors to this theory
were Anne Robert Jacques Turgot and Antoine Yves Goguet. See id. at 68-76, 91, 94-98. The
principal Scottish contributors were John Dairymple, Lord Kames, and Adam Smith. See P.
Stein, Legal Evolution: The Story of an Idea 23-46 (1980).
204 See P. Stein, supra note 203, at 23.
205 See, e.g., A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 5,
22, 259 (E. Cannon ed. 1937) (London 1776).
206 See, e.g., London Chron., Jan. 24, 1778, quoted in D. McCoy, The Elusive Republic:
Political Economy in Jeffersonian America 20 (1980).
207 See id.
208 See A. Smith, supra note 205, at 22, 259.
209 The current version of this story is told, using the metaphor of allocative efficiency, by
economists like Harold Demsetz. See generally Demsetz, supra note 74 (shifts from common
to private ownership of resources have increased social wealth).
201

202
203
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mode of social development. Adam Smith, for example, characterized
the hunting stage as "the most rude and barbarous of any" state of society, and the modem commercial society as reflecting the "polish," taste,
2 10
and manners of a refined society.
Here we have the theme, with which Montesquieu and David Hume
usually are associated, of commerce as a moderating, socializing phe-

nomenon-"le doux commerce," as Montesquieu called

it,211

or "mild-

ness," in Hume's language. 212 Far from being the source of instability
Jefferson feared, commerce was understood as having a softening effect
on manners and stabilizing social behavior regardless of the form of government ruling the society. 2 13 Far from constituting a threat to the publie good, commerce promoted the common welfare by stimulating
individual initiative and industry that made for a responsible and independent citizenry that itself was indispensible to the maintenance of a
virtuous republic. 214 And far from undermining individual autonomy,
the dynamism and fluidity of commercial society prevented the re-creation of feudal hierarchies in which status determined all and ownership
of property secured personal independence in fact only for one person,
215
the king.
3.

Toward a Rapprochement Between Commerce and Virtue

The meaning of commerce that Scottish writers developed made
available to American political and legal writers a theory, compatible
with republicanism, that linked virtue with commerce. 2 16 This linkage
allowed for the possibility of overcoming the civic-humanist understanding that virtue and commerce were incompatible and that cultivated freehold land and the commercial market were rival agents of liberation from
210 A. Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence 107, 512 (R. Meek, D. Raphael & P. Stein eds.
1978) (n.p. n.d.).
211 On the development of the notion of "le doux commerce" in the project of legitimating

commercial society, see A. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments
for Capitalism Before Its Triumph 56-67 (1977).
212 Hume developed this argument most fully in two essays: "Of Commerce" and "Of Refinements in the Arts," reprinted in 3 Hume's Philosophical Works 287, 302 (T. Greene & T.

Grose eds. 1866).
213 See Hirschman, Rival Interpretations of Market Society, 20 J. Econ. Literature 1463
(1982).

214 See D. Richards, supra note 124, at 57-64.
215 See H. Maine, Ancient Law (1874). Maine went so far as to suggest that the liberating
force of commerce marked not only a progressive evolution but a teleology.
216 On the influence of Scottish Enlightenment ideas on Americans in the eighteenth century, see, e.g., A. Hook, supra note 104, at 17-72; H. May, The Enlightenment in America
(1976); F. McDonald, supra note 69, at 119-23, 131-35 (1985); D. Meyer, The Democratic
Enlightenment (1976); G. Wills, Explaining America 15-23 (1981); Conrad, Metaphor and

Imagination in James Wilson's Theory of Federal Union, 13 L. & Soc. Inq. 1, 18-19 (1988);
Hamburger, supra note 99, at 254-58.
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America's "feudal" past. Indeed, the reworking of what commerce
promised meant a redefinition of principal republican terms, including
"virtue," "corruption," and "luxury," that allowed for a redefinition of
21 7
American republicanism from civic to commercial republicanism.
And, in fact, American republican thought did, to some extent, rely
on the "solution" that the Scottish understanding of history provided.
The classical conception of virtue, which American civic republicans, influenced by the cyclical understanding of history, commonly had articulated by invoking the name of Sparta,2 18 was replaced gradually by a
more "modem" public meaning that associated virtue with individual
productivity rather than with self-abnegation or austerity.2 19 This redefinition is best understood as the result of a critique that occurred within
republican culture rather than as evidence of a victory won by an antagonistic external ideology.
Civic republicans like John Adams early on expressed skepticism
about the plausibility of individuals practicing self-denial in the long
run.2 20 Sharing much of the outlook on human nature that animated the
critiques of classical virtue carried on in England, Scotland, and France,
an outlook that asserted the primacy of private passion for personal gain
as fundamental to the human personality, most American civic republi217 See generally D. McCoy, supra note 206, at 20-32. As Part V shows, however, while
redefinitions of important terms in the republican vocabulary seemingly eliminated the dialectical tension between virtue and commerce, they could not eliminate the basic source of the
tension altogether. The premodern, republican dialectic of temporality, metaphorically expressing the modem dialectic of sociality, continued to be articulated by later Federalist writers like Noah Webster. "Redefinition," then, did not produce a "transformation."
Within antebellum nineteenth-century legal culture, the most influential articulation of
this redefinition was James Kent's discussion of property in his Commentaries on American
Law, published in the 1830s. See J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 80-94, 586-637
(Boston 1867) (New York 1826).
218 See G. Wood, supra note 3, at 114-18.
219 The seeds for this shift were planted by the classical-republican emphasis on activity and
personal industriousness. See, e.g., B. Franklin, Information to Those Who Would Remove to
America (n.p. 1782), reprinted in 8 The Writings of Benjamin Franklin 603 (A. Smyth ed.
1907); J. Witherspoon, Lectures on Moral Philosophy 114 (V. Collins ed. 1912). This theme
provided a key bridge between classical theorists and Scottish Enlightenment writers like
Hume and Smith.
As Drew Mcoy observes, the changing meaning of virtue is "an exceedingly complex
subject worthy ofa fill-length study in itself." D. McCoy, supra note 206, at 78 n.3. For good
secondary sources, see J.G.A. Pocock, Politics, Language, and Time 100-03 (1971); G.
Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government 100-03 (1970); Lerner,
Character and Commerce: The Anglo-American as a New-Model Man, 36 Win. & Mary Q. 3,
13-26 (1979).

220 On Adans's pessimism about the American character, see G. Wood, supra note 3, at
567-92; cf. J. Howe, The Changing Political Thought of John Adams 16-27 (1966) (pointing
out that Adams's views on human nature likely were informed by his experiences in law practice). For a discussion of Adams as the last great American classical republican, see Z.
Haraszti, John Adams and the Prophets of Progress (1952).
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cans, including Jefferson, realized that the rise of commerce could not be
stopped altogether and that the emergence of commerce in America indicated at least some taste for private gain.
The redefinition was driven internally also in the sense that the oscillation between the cyclical and linear visions of history tended to undermine the premises of the cyclical version, namely that it was desirable to
return to a classical understanding of virtue. The association of virtue
with Sparta was a metaphorical articulation that was intelligible only to
the extent that history was understood as cyclical. The American republic had to be seen as the restoration of a polis even older than that of the
ancient Gothic constitution. But the continual reappearance of a linear
vision of history, often blended with cyclical rhetoric, made such a belief
tenuous and fraught with ambiguity.2 2 1 Redefining the meaning of virtue
as individual productivity clarified the direction of history as continously
linear and provided grounds for overcoming anxieties about the implications of modernity. Virtue was no longer associated with the past, represented by Sparta, but with the future. This shift was the basis for
reconciling virtue with time.
The Scottish Enlightenment theory of social, economic, and legal
development thus signalled three claims: the inexorability of society's
embeddedness in time, the inexorability of change that follows from the
movement of time, and the beneficial consequences of that change. To
American thinkers, the structure of the theory was attractive insofar as it
created a basis for embracing time and what it brings with it, modernity.
The theory always depicted social development as a movement from past
to future: society is constantly moving away from, escaping as it were,
the past. Since the past signified rudeness, barbarity, hierarchy, and dependency, the constant development of societies away from it signified
continual social improvement.
However, the Scottish social theorists themselves were not unqualified in their optimism. Too perceptive not to understand the full implications of their theory, they appreciated that their logic provided no basis
for viewing commercial society as a terminus. Their theory was not teleological, only evolutionary. Commercial society was no millennium,
Christian or otherwise, to the Scottish writers. The process of change
that leads from primitive to commercial society could lead easily to social
degeneration. Lord Kames expressed this view in stating, "this [commercial] state is never permanent: great opulence opens a wide door to
221 If history was understood as linear, then there was no possibility of a return to a restoration of the ancient republics. The very availability of the linear theory made it difficult for late
eighteenth-century intellectual republicans to be completely confident about the cyclical
theory.
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indolence, sensuality, corruption, prostitution, perdition. ' ' 222 This logic,
which seemed to the Scots so clearly confirmed by the experience of the
Greek and Roman empires, hinted, then, at a return to the classical civicrepublican understanding of history as cyclical. 223 The fear that what lay
beyond the commercial stage might be a socially and morally inferior
stage did not represent a return to the cyclical theory of history, though,
as much as it indicated the Scottish writers' awareness that excessive
wealth can undermine the very personal characteristics that led to the
accumulation of wealth. A linear theory is not necessarily continuously
progressive, particularly if it is not teleological. The Scots' linear theory
was based on their understanding of the human personality, as they experienced and observed it in others. As J.G.A. Pocock has pointed out,
the Scottish theorists retained the sense of the delicacy of virtue as the
aspect of personality that regrettably, but unavoidably, is lost with the
emergence of specialization and diversification in commercial society.
They foresaw the possibility of what is known today as the "atomized
society" as an unintended consequence of the subordination of politics in
the commercial stage, and they regarded that possibility with dread
rather than with approval.2 2 4
The linear theory of social development affected the American republican meaning of property in several ways. First, it replaced the simple feudal/allodial dichotomy with a more complex array of property
forms associated with each stage of social development. Second, by uncoupling personality from any specific form of property, it provided
grounds for optimism about historical change, though not without some
doubt.225 Historicizing the forms of property in terms of stages of production meant that the change in the form of ownership from that of
allodial land to that of newer forms of property, especially intangible and
highly mobile forms, did not necessarily corrupt social or moral personality. Indeed, the theory historicized moral personality as well, showing
that rather than being lost in the past, it had simply adapted to new
circumstances. Third, and most importantly, it implied that time and
history favored individuated ownership. The Scottish historical social
theorists had claimed that ownership that is strongly public existed in
only precommercial stages. 226 Precommercial societies at first lacked
any concept of ownership at all, and when a concept of ownership did
222 H. Home, Lord Kames, Sketches of the History of Man 525 (Edinburgh 1774).
223 See D. McCoy, supra note 206, at 32-40. On the theme of cyclical social change in

eighteenth-century American thought, see Persons, supra note 192, at 154-63.
224 See J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 15, at 121-23.
225 See J.G.A. Pocock, Civic Humanism and Its Role in Anglo-American Thought, in Politics, Language and Time 80, 100-03 (1971).
226 See, e.g., A. Smith, supra note 210, at 19-21, 200-03, 207-08, 459-60.
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develop, it predominantly was communal. Even where individuated
ownership did exist in precommercial societies, a wide variety of communal use-interests encumbered the freedom to do with one's property as
one pleased. By contrast, the defining characteristic of ownership in
commercial society was the drastic reduction of such communal entanglements, thereby consolidating the control of one's own assets.
The message of this progressive theory of history, then, was to historicize the Harringtonian vision of property and individual autonomy as
prerequisites to the individual pursuit of an active civic life. For the upshot of their account of social development was that the classical republican interpretation of property was fated by the logic of history to
disappear with the passing of precommercial society. In this respect, the
Scottish progressive historical theory of property and society was an
early, though somewhat softened, version of necessitarian arguments for
individuated ownership that became increasingly prominent in the nine-7
teenth century and that remain prominent in legal writing today.2
Changes in social conditions, the thesis implied (and modem scholars
explicitly assert) necessitate changes in forms of ownership. More to the
point, individuation of control over items of property takes precedence
over more socialized (less formalized) forms of ownership not as a matter
of social choice or of ideology but as a matter of historical inevitability.
Republican history was giving birth to a notion of private individuality
opposed to its earlier emphasis on civic participation.
4.

The Multiple Meanings of Individual Liberty and Its Relation to
Property

The conception of individual autonomy that operates in the Scottish
conception of property is no longer that of the civic-republican notion of
self-sufficiency as a precondition for virtuous politics. The Scottish historical social theorists did not define individual liberty as the condition in
which the citizen is liberated from distractions so that he is able to participate actively in the affairs of the polity for the well-being of all.
Rather it meant freedom from constraints on the ability, through individual initiative, to pursue one's own conception of the good. That is, it was
a kind of prototype for what political philosophers today call "negative
liberty. '228 To be sure, like the idea of negative liberty, the Scottish conception of individual liberty shared with the civic-republican understand227 On the theme of functional necessity in legal historiography, see Gordon, Critical Legal
Iistories, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 57 (1984). The most extreme versions of the theme are those by
nonhistorian scholars who resort to history as a source that verifies their instrumental claims.
This is particularly true of law-and-economics scholars who have written about history, including Demsetz, supra note 74. It also is true, of course, for Marxist historiography.
228 See I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty 118-72 (1969).
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ing of individual liberty a strongly social dimension. Individual
autonomy still meant having the capacity to engage with others from a
position of independence. But its objective of sociability had shifted from
the purpose of governance that was central to the civic-republican understanding to the purpose of satisfaction of personal ends.
This redefinition of individual autonomy and its relationship to
property influenced American writers, particularly during the years after
the Revolution. This shift in meaning was prompted in part by the need
to respond to what appeared to some American republicans in the late
229
eighteenth century to be the inevitability of the triumph of commerce.
It also was prompted by the political struggle over the Federal Constitution.230 The story that the Scottish historians told seemed to confirm to
their American readers the political course Americans were adopting
they were witnessing with
(just as it confirmed what the Scots thought
231
changes).
political
and
economic
their own
Changes (or perceived changes) in economic and political circumstances, and psychological reactions to those changes, only partly explain
the shifts in the meaning of individual liberty and property. It is dangerously easy to exaggerate the extent to which there was a redefinition and
to say, using our own vocabulary, that republicanism focused on public
virtue in the mid-eighteenth century and private virtue thereafter. The
meanings of liberty and property throughout the eighteenth century
combined elements of both the public and private. 232 Liberty was highly
ambiguous, and its very ambiguity facilitated interpretive shifts. The redefinition, then, was due as much to endogenous factors as to exogenous
changes.
229 See text accompanying notes 192-95 supra.
230 In a book that appeared after this Article was substantially complete, Jennifer Nedeisky

argues that the basic structure of American constitutionalism-its limitation of governmental
power for the purpose of protecting individual rights--developed with private property as the
Framers' model for individual rights. See J. Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of
American Constitutionalism (1990). Madison was the crucial figure in this reformulation, she
argues. I entirely agree that Madison's conception of property was modem, certainly much
closer to Hamilton's thoroughly commodified conception than to Jefferson's fear of cornmodification. See The Federalist No. 10 (J. Madison) and, especially, Madison, Property,
Nat'l Gazette, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in 14 The Papers of James Madison 266 (R. Rutland &
T. Mason eds. 1983) [hereinafter Madison Papers]. While Madison was opposed unambiguously to government redistribution of property, it is at least arguable that on this issue his
views did not differ fundamentally from Jefferson's. See text accompanying notes 109-12
supra.
231 There was a kind of collective-adaptive preference, a response to avoid cognitive dissonance-the psychological frustration of attempting to change seemingly inevitable conditions-at work in both cases. The notion of adaptive preferences is developed at length in J.
Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (1983).
232 See M. Kammen, Spheres of Liberty: Changing Perceptions of Liberty in American
Culture 15-52 (1986).
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To make this point more concrete, consider the meaning of individual liberty in relation to virtue, the concept with which liberty was inextricably connected in republican discourse. There is a tendency in recent
historiography to interpret the civic-republican term "virtue" as the
equivalent of altruism, that is, an abnegation of self-interest for the sake
of others' welfare. 233 This interpretation is understandable in view of
such republican rhetoric as Benjamin Rush's: "Every man in a republic
is public property. His time and talents-his youth-his manhood-his
old age-nay more, life, all belong to his country. ' 234 Lance Banning
has pointed out, however, that what American civic republicans contemplated was "vigorous assertions of the self within a context of communal
'235
consciousness and a willingness to live by the community's decisions.
Virtue meant acting on the basis of self-interest, as opposed to self-absorption. This meaning of virtue in turn affected the meaning of liberty.
Virtue required that citizens live in liberty. If acting virtuously meant
acting according to one's self-interest, then liberty must mean negative
freedom. Individuals must be freed from external, including political,
constraints inhibiting their pursuit of individual wants.
There is obviously a strong tension, if not a contradiction, between
this private aspect of virtue and liberty and the public obligation to accommodate one's interests with the needs and decisions of the community. The Revolutionaries had sought to resolve the dialectic of self and
other, separation and union, through their thesis that once hierarchy was
abolished, by purging the common law of property of its feudal corruptions, for example, each individual's permanent interests would merge
with the public interest. As republicans later became increasingly skeptical about this thesis, the tension inherent in the early republican conceptions of virtue and liberty became more apparent. 2 36 Realization that the
original American understanding of those concepts was unworkable
prompted a reworking of their meaning.
Just as it would be wrong to ignore the private aspect of virtue and
liberty in early American republican discourse, it would be misleading to
suppose that the thrust of the configuration of liberty and property that
emerged in the late eighteenth century was strictly negative. Separation
233 This interpretation is explained and corrected in Banning, Some Second Thoughts on
Virtue and the Course of Revolutionary Thinking, in Conceptual Change and the Constitution
194 (T. Ball & J.G.A. Pocock eds. 1988).
234 B. Rush, On the Defects of the Confederation (1787), reprinted in The Selected Writings
of Benjamin Rush 31 (D. Runes ed. 1947).
235 Banning, supra note 233, at 200.
236 A typical expression of this growing awareness was the observation in a 1783 pamphlet
that "the interests of society and the rights of individuals a[re] distinct." G. Wood, supra note
3, at 609 (quoting Rudiments of Law and Government, Deduced from the Law of Nature...
(Charleston 1783)).
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perhaps was being given greater weight after 1787, but the relationalindeed, the civic-theme of property had by no means disappeared.
There remained a dialectic. Thus for Federalists like Madison, Wilson,
and Noah Webster, the meaning of individual liberty was not confined to
freedom from governmental oppression but included the expectation that
237
one would use one's abilities in active participation in public life.
Property was crucial in this conception of individual liberty. For property, which so strongly symbolized stability to those trained in the common law, assured the conditions that were necessary for the exercise of

one's skills in the public sphere. To these Federalists, moreover, the public sphere was not confined to governance but included commerce. Extending the theme of le doux commerce,2 38 these writers regarded
commerce as beneficial in part because of its socializing consequences.
To be free to engage in commerce was to participate in public life.
Perhaps the clearest example of this attempt to connect private activity and public life through the configuration of individual liberty and
property was James Madison's famous 1792 essay on property. 239 There,
Madison explicitly contended that the term property has two meanings.
It simultaneously embraces, he argued, a private, Blackstonian conception and a public, if not civic, conception. 24° The private meaning is the
familiar legal conception of property as "'that dominion which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in exclusion of
every other individual.' "241 What Madison emphasized was that a second, and "juster" meaning, must be added to this common-law understanding. 242 In this second sense, property "embraces every thing to
which a man may attach a value and have a right. '2 43 The first meaning
includes a man's "land," "merchandize," and "money." The second
sense extends the meaning of property to include a person's opinions and
"the free communication of them." 244 It also includes "the free use of
237 For Madison, see Madison, supra note 230, reprinted in 14 Madison Papers, supra note
230 at 266; for Webster, see N. Webster, An Examination of the Leading Principles of the
Federal Constitution (Philadelphia 1787), reprinted in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the
United States 25, 57-58 (P. Ford ed. 1888); for Wilson, see T. Pangle, The Spirit of Modem
Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke 95
(1988).
238 See generally A. Hirschman, supra note 111.
239 Madison, supra note 230, reprinted in 14 Madison Papers, supra note 230, at 266.
240 See id.
241 Id. (quoting 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *2).
242 See id.
243 Id. Madison added a qualification to this second definition: "and which leaves to everyone else the like advantage." Id. (emphasis in original). This, of course, echoes the Lockean
proviso concerning the extent of each individual's right to appropriate resources from the state
of nature. See J. Locke, Two Treatises on Government § 27, at 304 (P. Laslett ed. 1960)
(London 1698).
244 Madison, supra note 230, reprinted in 14 Madison Papers, supra note 230, at 266.

HeinOnline -- 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 331 1991

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:273

[one's] faculties and the free choice of the objects on which to employ
them. ' 24 5 This second meaning encompasses what we today would think
of as "civil" rights. Part of Madison's strategy was to assure the greatest
possible protection for such rights by elevating them to the status of
"property." 246 But Madison also was indicating that property, in both
senses, contemplates activity. Activity, the property of exercising one's
"faculties," connects property with individual liberty, but it also connects individuals with society. Madison's message was that property is
not atomizing but that it is socializing. The individual liberty that is
associated with property, moreover, does not mean that individuals are
isolated from the larger society and polity. Rather it means that they are
freed from constraints on becoming involved in the broader community
through the full use of their abilities. The private and exclusive aspect of
the configuration of property and liberty, therefore, complements the
public aspect by enabling individual activity.
Summarizing this point, certain redefinitions in the late eighteenth
century within American republicanism have been identified in which
property and time are interconnected at the center. These redefinitions
signalled the emergence of a cultural understanding of property that departed in several crucial respects from the meaning that civic republicans
created while simultaneously retaining much of the rhetoric of civic republicanism. Individual autonomy and property remained closely linked
in the emerging code, but the linkage increasingly was understood as oriented toward a private realm of activity outside the arena of governance.
These redefinitions also responded to the predicament that time
posed for the coherence of civic republicanism's conception of property.
Specifically, they permitted republicans to embrace modernity rather
than to fear it. This acceptance of change was important particularly
245 Id.
246 John Phllip Reid rightly stresses what he calls "the 'propertyness' of rights" in the legal
culture of eighteenth-century America. J.Reid, supra note 103, at 98-102. The bolstering
effect of assimilating the language of property and the language of civil rights was reciprocal.
Not only did it enhance the stature of civil rights, but, to the extent that those rights were
considered natural and sacred, it protected property rights as well. Both Federalists and AntiFederalists were anxious to protect private property to encourage prosperity. See 2 G. Haskins
& H. Johnson, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Foundations of Power: John
Marshall, 1801-15, at 560 (1981). The Federalists differed from the Anti-Federalists, however,
in identifying the tyranny of the masses, resulting from democratic excesses, as a threat to
private property. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 10 (J. Madison). This diagnosis led them to
rely on the judiciary, rather than legislatures, as the appropriate institution to set the boundaries of property rights. In the early nineteenth century, the United States Supreme Court,
under the leadership of the Federalist John Marshall, eagerly assumed that responsibility, creating a legal meaning of property rights as rooted in the common law and understood as the
ancient constitution. The clearest articulation of this understanding is Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). See generally J. Nedesky, supra note 230, at 186-276 (judicial
review and competing conceptions of property).
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with respect to property because it enabled American republican lawyers
increasingly to accept with approval, or at least without unqualified anxiety, emerging forms of property in American society. In particular, historicizing property facilitated acceptance of emerging intangible and
speculative economic interests as property.
5.

The Triumph of Imaginary Property

Although Blackstone's account of the law of property as having to
do with rights as to "things" 247 would seem to imply that English common law confined property to tangible assets, intangible interests were
hardly unknown to the eighteenth-century common law of property.
Property then included, among other interests, a variety of future possessory interests (remainders, reversions, and executory interests), some of
which provided the interest-holder with only the slightest possibility of
ever becoming entitled to take possession of the assets. In addition, legal
property included a category of interests that common lawyers called
"incorporeal hereditaments." 248 These interests were mostly what modem property lawyers call easements and profits in land but also included
such remnants of feudal land law as advowsons and tithes. 24 9 They were
assimilated thoroughly into the common-law fabric as "things," despite
the legal awareness that, as Blackstone stated, "[t]heir existence is merely
in idea and abstracted contemplation." 250 By the late eighteenth century,
economic changes, facilitated by legal changes, had introduced new sorts
of intangible and speculative interests that were more important, both
quantitatively and qualitatively, than had been the old intangible interests. Changes in both commercial practices and in public finance had
made transferable paper forms of property, including promissory notes,
banknotes, and certificates of public debt, increasingly important forms
of wealth in the last decade of the eighteenth century.2 51 Changes in the
law regarding commercial paper during the second half of the eighteenth
century enabled negotiable paper to succeed over the traditional legal
252
strictures against the assignment of choses in action.
In the realm of public finance, even before the adoption in 1790 of
Alexander Hamilton's plan for strengthening public credit by funding
the enormous public debt, masses of public securities, such as loan certifi2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *16.
Blackstone devoted the third chapter of the second volume of his treatise to incorporeal
hereditaments. See id. at *20-*43.
249 Advowson was the right to nominate the rector of a church. On the development of
incorporeal hereditaments, see generally A. Simpson, An Introduction to the History of the
Land Law 97-100 (1961).
M 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *20.
251 See F. McDonald, supra note 69, at 115-19.
252 See M. Horwitz, supra note 2, at 212-15.
247
248
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cates issued by Congress, appeared on the market and were traded heavily by speculators. 253 The Hamiltonian funding plan, which included
issuing new federal securities in exchange for old public securities and
creating a Bank of the United States, strengthened confidence in public
credit and decisively established liquid forms of property as central to the
254
economy.
All of these debt instruments, governmental and nongovernmental,
represented property that was based on nothing more than promises,
hopes, and expectations. American opponents of Hamilton's plan, echoing the arguments raised earlier in the eighteenth century by opponents
of Walpole's scheme for saving public credit in England, 255 pointed to
just this fact in their efforts to stem the shift from the form of property
that was, it seemed to many skeptics, literally "real property" to a form
of property that rested on nothing more real than imagination. Yet even
prior to the boom in public credit and paper property, common lawyers
already had identified intangible interests as property. For example, future interests in landed estates were nothing more than expectations but
were deemed to be property nonetheless. 256 And while courts classified
the inheritance interest in an expectant heir during the ancestor's lifetime
as a "mere expectancy," English equity courts accorded to such interests
many of the same characteristics as strict property interests, the most
important of these being alienability. 2 57 All of these legal changes reflected a gradual and general shift in legal understanding of what could
be the subject of property, from assets that were tangible and stable to
assets that were intangible, speculative, and highly fluid.
It is not hard to discern a basic compatibility between these emerging notions of property and historical time and the outlook of those
American lawyers and political writers who unambiguously rejected republicanism of all types, in particular Alexander Hamilton, who was the
clearest exponent of the antiregulation conception of property and of
government. 2 58 To be sure, Hamilton and other (though certainly not
253 See generally E. Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public Finance, 1776-1790, at 179-286 (1961).
254 See F. McDonald, supra note 69, at 115-17, 135-42.
255 In England, the reaction against speculative and liquid forms of property, particularly
shares in the public debt, made Walpole and his "sinking fund" scheme for managing the large
public debt hated symbols among those who comprised the "Opposition," mainly neo-Harringtonian agrarian republicans and "real" Tories. See I. Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His
Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole 39-56 (1968).
256 See 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *166.
257 See Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 253, 267-76
(1947).

258 As Professor Nedelsky recently observed, Hamilton most clearly articulated the Feder-

alist plan that "offered in place of active political involvement a distant but smoothly functioning state that would ensure the conditions necessary for the effective pursuit of private gain."
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all) Federalists, by advocating that government be structured around the
pursuit of individual gain, did more than simply shift the meaning of
virtue to something more compatible with commercialism; they explicitly
rejected it as both implausible and unnecessary. In doing so, they radically altered the vocabulary of politics, law, and property from that of
the Jeffersonian civic-republican culture. But in saying this, one must be
careful not to overlook the degree of continuity that accompanied
change. To appreciate how much continuity accompanied conceptual
change, the new dialectic of property that emerged in the waning years of
eighteenth-century American political and legal writing must be examined. In doing so, one finds reason to reconsider the conventional wisdom that the postconstitutional era, specifically the 1790s, marked a
dramatic transformation in American political-legal discourse.
V
DESCENT AND DISSENT FROM THE Cvic MEANING
OF PROPERTY

A.

American Dissentfrom the Civic Meaning of Property

Let us begin with the changes that did occur by focusing upon the
American critique of the concept that was the keystone of the entire
civic-republican structure: virtue. In that the American critique of the
classical notion of virtue appears in The FederalistPapers, this critique
may as well be labelled "Federalist," though schisms quickly appear
within that ideology.
The critique of virtue did not originate, at least not entirely, in
American writings. Gerald Stourzh has documented thoroughly the influence of Hume-a critic of republican virtue-on Hamilton, 25 9 and important elements of Hamilton's and Madison's essays derived from
Hobbes and Mandeville, via Hume and Sir James Stueart. 26° The entire
J. Nedelsky, supra note 230, at 167.
It is now widely recognized that Hamilton's promotion of the Bank of the United States,
his endorsement of a class of fundholding public creditors, and his vision of America as a
commercial empire made him the American Walpole, whose name symbolized precisely the

modem Whig corruption that consumed the attention of the English descendants of Harrington. On Hamilton's critique of republicanism, see G. Stourzh, supra note 219, at 272.
259 See G. Stourzh, supra note 219, at 21, 30, 40, 42-43, 71-72, 117-19.
260 See F. McDonald, supra note 69, at 119-120; G. Stourzh, supra note 219, at 72-74.
Hobbes and Mandeville argued that private passions worked to the advantage of the polity.

See T. Hobbes, The Leviathan 24-25 (Oakeshott ed. 1962) (n.p. 1651); B. Mandeville, The
Fable of the Bees passim (F. Kaye ed. 1924) (n.p. 1795). Stueart's treatise, An Inquiry into the
Principles of Political Oeconomy (A. Skinner 1966) (n.p. 1767), apparently was read with
approval by Hamilton and Madison. See F. McDonald, supra note 69, at 119. Stueart's principles, as McDonald observes, were "squarely, albeit not professedly" Mandevilleian. Id.
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discursive structure through which the critique was conducted, moreover, was inherited from Machiavelli, Rousseau, and, more immediately,
Montesquieu. The most important element of this structure was an elab-

orate metaphorical opposition between "virtue" and "passion."

Eighteenth-century republican writings in general depicted "passion" as threatening "virtue" and with it "the public good. '26 1 "Passion" and "public good" were code words. "Passion" signified not
merely self-interest but self-aggrandisement as well.262 "Virtue" was a
code term that signified commitment to others, that is, "public good."
The conflict between passion and virtue can be translated then into the
modem conflict between self-interest and community.
Montesquieu never addressed this conflict directly. Rather, he attempted to mediate the opposition between virtue and passion by locating passion in the public sphere, passion for the common good. 263 This
move dissolved the opposition between virtue and passion because it defined virtue itself as passion for the good of the polity.
Montesquieu's interpretation of the relationship between virtue and
passion particularly influenced John Adams. 26 More than any other
American republican, Adams systematically worked through the ambiguous meaning of virtue. He wrote in 1776: "There must be a positive
Passion for the public good... established in the Minds of the People, or
there can be no Republican Government, nor any real liberty; and this
public Passion must be superior to all private Passions." 2 65 By 1787,
however, Adams had lowered his sights substantially. The Montesquieuian conception of virtue now seemed to him to be unrealistic:
Moral and Christian and political virtue, cannot be too much beloved,
practised, or rewarded; but to place liberty on that foundation only
would not be safe; but it may be well questioned, whether love of the
body politic is precisely moral as Christian virtues, which requires justice and benevolence to enemies as well as friends, and to other nations
as well as our own. It is not true, in fact, that any people ever existed
who loved the public better than themselves, their private friends,
of love, is as
neighbours, and therefore this kind of virtue, this sort
266
precarious a foundation for liberty as honor or fear.
What kind of virtue, then, did Adams think plausible as a foundaSee J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 4, at 462-505.
See The Federalist No. 10 (J. Madison).
263 See, e.g., C. Secondut [Baron de Montesquieu], supra note 71, at bk. 1, ch. iii.
264 On Adams's reading of Montesquieu, see 1 The Diary and Autobiography of John Adams 123 n.19, 142 (L. Butterfield ed. 1962).
265 Letter from John Adams to Mercy Warren (Apr. 16, 1776), reprinted in 1 Letters of
John Adams and Mercy Warren 222 (P. Ford ed. 1917).
266 J. Adams, Defence of the Constitutions of the United States (n.p. 1787), reprinted in 6
Adams Works, supra note 46, at 208.
261
262
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tion for liberty?
[I]t is the laws alone that really love the country, the public, the whole
better than any part; and that form of government which unites all the
virtues, honor, and fear of the citizens in a reverence and obedience to
the laws, is the only one in which liberty can be secure, and all orders,
and ranks, and parties, compelled to prefer the public good before their
ow% .... 267

In expressing a decidedly less robust understanding of virtue-an
understanding that reduces political virtue to obedience to the rule of
law-Adams joined the company of other American writers whose early
faith in republican virtue had weakened since the early Revolutionary
years. William Vans Murray was especially direct in articulating these
doubts, observing that if virtue were "of so delicate a nature, as to suffer
extinction by the prevalence of those luxurious habits to which all national improvements lead-it certainly is a principle of too whimsical a
nature to be relied on."' 268 Even earlier, during the debate over the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1778, Theophilus Parsons had
expressed skepticism about the human capacity to sustain virtue: "It
may be said, the virtuous American would blast with indignation the
man, who should offer him a bribe. Let it now be admitted as a fact. We
ask, will that always be the case? The most virtuous states have become
vicious.

' '269

Virtue and passion increasingly became opposed terms, and it was
expected that passion would be the ultimate victor in the war with virtue.
The critique of virtue asserted the primacy of passion over virtue on both
ontological and political grounds. Ontologically, selfishness was assumed to be fundamental to human nature, virtue to be artificial, forced,
or utopian. Politically, the paradox of selfish behavior producing political well-being was articulated increasingly. Hamilton forcefully asserted
both grounds in a relentless attack on the civic conception of virtue. In
the New York Ratifying Convention, for example, he left no room for
doubt concerning his hardboiled outlook on human nature, stating:
"Men will pursue their interests. It is as easy to change human nature, as
to oppose the strong current of the selfish passions. ' 270 Similarly, his
political theory clearly showed the influence of the critiques of Hume,
Hobbes, and Mandeville. Again at the New York Ratifying Convention,
267

Id.

W. Murray, Political Sketches: By a Citizen of the United States, No. 8: Virtue (London
1787), reprinted in The American Museum and Repository 231 (2d ed. 1787).
269 T. Parsons, Jr., Memoir of Theophilus Parsons by His Son, Theophilus Parsons 378
(1970) (Cambridge 1859).
270 Hamilton, Address to the New York Ratifying Convention (June 25, 1788), reprinted in
5 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 85 (H. Syrett ed. 1961) [hereinafter Hamilton Papers].
268
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he echoed Mandeville's notorious formula 2 71 of the public benefit of private vices:
Look through the rich and the poor of the community; the learned and
the ignorant. Where does virtue predominate? The difference indeed
consists, not in the quantity but kind of vices, which are incident to the
various classes; and here the advantage of character belongs to the
wealthy. Their vices are probably more favorable to the prosperity of
the state, than those of the indigent; and partake less of moral
272
depravity.
2 73
This redefinition, in which Hamilton was not an isolated figure,
had profound consequences for the public meaning of commerce and

property. The civic-republican sociology of virtue posited that virtue was
possible only under Spartan conditions; what was required, Montesquieu
had argued, was a "mediocrity of fortunes. '274 While this did not entail
an "extreme equality," civic republicanism did insist that both ends of
the economic spectrum, great wealth and poverty, were incompatible
with virtue. The whole purpose of property was to serve public good by

establishing stable conditions for virtuous citizenship. Hamilton did
nothing less than stand this analysis on its head, arguing that concern for
the public good would be "a graceful appendage of wealth," rather than
the other way around. 275 Public spiritedness was, in his view, a by-product of private gain rather than its rival. Hamilton considered the ideal of
maintaining only modest disparities in wealth altogether futile. His complete repudiation of the civic-republican meaning of property in favor of

a commercial meaning of property was unambiguous: "The difference of
property is already among us. Commerce and industry will increase the
disparity. '2 76 Even more strikingly, he noted:
As riches increase and accumulate in few hands; as luxury prevails in
society; virtue will be in a greater degree considered as only a graceful
appendage to wealth, and the tendency of things will be to depart from
See B. Mandeville, supra note 260, at 41-94.
Hamilton, Address to the New York Ratifying Convention (June 21, 1788), reprinted in
5 Hamilton Papers, supra note 270, at 43.
273 By 1787, for example, John Adams had come to believe that there was no age in which
personal "avarice" did not override love of the common good. See text accompanying notes
266-67 supra.
It is not uncommon to find Hamilton's views depicted as peculiar within his generation.
See Rossiter, Hamilton's Political Science, in Alexander Hamilton: A Profile 185, 197-98 (J.
Cooke ed. 1967). As Gerald Stourzh and others have shown, at least by the time of the Constitution, Hamilton, although exemplary, was aberrational among his contemporaries. See L.
Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology 138-40 (1978); G.
Stourzh, supra note 219, at 76-125.
274 C. Secondat [Baron de Montesquieu], supra note 71, at bk. 1, ch. ili.
275 Hamilton, supra note 272, reprinted in 5 Hamilton Papers, supra note 270, at 42.
276 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 432 (M. Farrand ed. 1966).
271

272
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the republican standard. This is the real disposition of human nature
277

In short, Hamilton sought to reverse the meaning of virtually every crucial concept in classical civic republicanism. Wealth, "luxury," and social and economic hierarchy all are embraced, while "virtue" is
subordinated to "avarice": the shining city on a hill, if it existed at all,
was the capital of the empire of commerce.
Most importantly, Hamilton did more to prompt a general redefinition of the relationship between the public and the private dimensions of
property than any other "Federalist." Within the Jeffersonian scheme,
property, though privatized in one sense, carried on the traditional republican function of facilitating active citizenship. Public and private
thus were not entirely distinct within this code, and they certainly were
not hostile to each other. Hamilton provided a figurative association that
created a wedge between the public and private, with the latter emerging
as the dominant domain of property. He critiqued political regimes in
which the relationship between nation-states and individuals is mediated
by quasi-sovereign political entities that use property to perform political
fimctions, as "the political monster of an imperium in imperio"278 -an
allusion with a particularly obnoxious meaning for republicans that
could not have been lost on Hamilton. He contrasted such regimes with
those adhering to the principle of legislation for individuals rather than
for states or sovereigns. 279 While the Jeffersonian vision did not contemplate state ownership of property, it did connect directly property with
political functions, both by emphasizing the political purpose of landholding by farmer-citizens and by favoring the exercise of governmental
authority over land through, for example, the scheme of distributing land
in accordance with republican political principles. Hamilton's vision, by
contrast, involved a more thorough privatization of property through the
"depropertization" of government. 2 80 It involved replacing the state
with the individual as the source of authority over property. At the risk
of stating the obvious, however, it also should be noted that the
Hamiltonian scheme of "depropertizing" government did not mean reducing governmental power. The scheme was hardly one of political anarchy. Rather, it involved replacing a constitutional vision of localized
government authority extending the tradition of the ancient constitution
28 1
with centralized authority.
277
278

Hamilton, supra note 272, reprinted in 5 Hamilton Papers, supra note 270, at 42.
The Federalist No. 15, at 93 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).

279 See id.
280 On the Federalist scheme of splitting property and government, see Rose, Book Review,

79 Nw. U.L. Rev. 216, 222-24 (1984).
281 Carol Rose has pointed out that while 1787 marked the rejection of localism as the
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Continuity with the Civic Meaning

As clearly as Hamilton exemplified dissent from the Jeffersonian
meanings of property and polity, other Federalist writings demonstrated
an intellectual descent from Jefferson. This continuity rested not only on
the continued use of civic language and the republican meanings of that
language. On a deeper level, federalist writing continued to sound some
of the same dialectical themes that animated civic-republican texts,
though the meaning of those dialectical themes were in a certain sense

displaced.
L

The Dialectic of Dynamism vs. Stability Redux

A dominant Jeffersonian dialectic was stability versus dynamism.
The civic-republican texts depicted stability and dynamism as simultaneously necessary for, and in contradiction with, the value of autonomy.
One aspect of individual autonomy, the dimension that saw liberty as
realized through involvement in public life, required stability. The other
aspect of autonomy, which connected personal liberty with social and, to
some extent, economic equality, required dynamism. Connecting dynamism with virtue, civic republicans saw a dynamism of virtue as the force
that would prevent the creation of aristocracy through unequal wealth.
The metaphorical distinction between the allodial and the feudal was the
rhetorical formulation of this dialectic most common in American legal
texts throughout this period and the early nineteenth century.
In one sense, Federalist writings from 1787 throughout the 1790s
approached the theme of stability and dynamism from a perspective that
was in tension with that of civic republicans. For if civic-republican ideology was inclined to favor stability over dynamism, accepting dynamism
grudgingly and with skepticism, federalism tilted the balance in favor of
dynamism. Hamilton's empire of commerce was nothing less than a vision of dynamism. His view of property confirmed this. For Hamilton,
the purpose of property was to serve private self-interest, and that purpose would be advanced by encouraging new forms of property to develop, including intangible property created both through credit
transactions in general and through the credit transactions of the national government and its agencies such as the Bank of the United States.
At the same time, however, dynamism remained an ambiguous and
ambivalently held notion. It mattered a great deal what sort of dynadominant constitutional meaning, it did not mark its disappearance. She identifies a continuous dialectic of politics that parallels the continuous dialectic of property with which this
Article is concerned. See Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. The Federalist Empire: Antifederalism from the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modem Localism, 84 Nw. U.L. Rev. 74,94-99
(1989).
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mism one had in mind. The Federalists, of course, were hardly likely to
favor political dynamism, at least if we associate political dynamism with
radical democracy or local political variation. 282 Nor were they likely to
favor social dynamism. They never doubted the existence of a natural
elite which, because of its superior intelligence, education, and practical
judgment, ought to be the ruling class. 28 3 The dynamism that animated
Federalist writings was an economic dynamism, which in turn required a
dynamic concept of property. But even that form of dynamism was a
source of ambivalence. One notion of economic dynamism calls for everexpanding commercial activity that generates greater amounts of aggregate wealth. But economic dynamism has another meaning that is in
tension with its wealth-creating understanding. This is a dynamism in
the distribution of social wealth. Such a meaning of dynamism very
quickly becomes an ideology of egalitarianism.
Egalitarian sentiments, of course, do not coexist easily with a commitment to political rule by a natural elite, and so it hardly is surprising
to find the rhetoric of stability shadowing the rhetoric of dynamism in
Federalist texts. No single text by a Federalist legal writer better illustrates this continued dialectical tension of dynamism and stability than
Noah Webster's 1787 essay urging the adoption of the new Constitution,
An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution.2 84 But equally important, this essay indicates the fundamental shift
in the terms of this dialectic. The earlier sense of anxiety about the effect
of a free-alienability policy on social relations was absent entirely from
Webster's essay. The commodity mentalitd had eclipsed the discourse of
civic personality.
2.

Change and Continuity: Noah Webster and the Emerging
Commercial Republican Meaning of Property

Noah Webster 28 5 sounded many of the themes that characterized
Federalist writings about property and politics, society and individual.
Attempting to deflect Anti-Federalist arguments that the new Constitution would destroy popular power in favor of congressional power, replace democracy with aristocracy, Webster used property as the
instrument for accommodating republican (and Anti-Federalist) notions
282 See text accompanying notes 79-84 supra.
283 See The Federalist No. 35, at 219-22 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
284 N. Webster, supra note 237, reprinted in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United

States 25 (P. Ford ed. 1888).

285 Robert Ferguson describes Webster as "[tihe most important man of letters in [the post-

Revolutionary] generation." R. Ferguson, Law & Letters in American Culture 274 (1984).
Although perhaps best known as a lexicographer, Webster was trained in the law. From 1793
to 1797, he was the editor of the influential newspaper, American Minerva, published in New

York.
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of individual autonomy and equality within a hierarchical society and
polity. The key to realizing this accommodation of conflicting visions
was the policy of unfettered circulation of property within society. Webster's defense of the Federalist scheme, premised on property, provided a
clear expression of the legal policy of alienability conjoined with freedom
of ownership. His essay 286 sounded not only many of the themes that
dominated late eighteenth-century American legal and political writing
about property,28 7 but also anticipated themes that increasingly would
dominate legal discourse in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In a
very real sense, then, Webster's essay was Janus-like.
Webster began his argument by affirming the link between democracy and property:
[Tjhe power of the people has increased in an exact proportion to their
acquisition of property. Wherever the right of primogeniture is established, property must accumulate and remain in families. Thus the
landed property in England will never be sufficiently distributed, to
give the powers of government wholly into the hands of the people.
But to assist the struggle for liberty, commerce has interposed, and in
conjunction with manufacturers, thrown a vast weight of property into
the democratic scale. Wherever we cast our eyes, we see this truth, that
property is the basis of power; and this, being established as a cardinal
point, directs us to the means of preserving our freedom. Make laws
...destroying and barring entailments; leave real estates to revolve
from hand to hand, as time and accident may direct; and no family
influence can be acquired and established for a series of generationsno man can obtain dominion over a large territory-the laborious and
saving, who are generally the best citizens, will possess each his share
of property and power, and thus the balance of wealth and power will
28 8
continue where it is, in the body of the people.
This passage expresses an astonishingly wide variety of themes, extending from those of Jefferson and Harrington to those of Hamilton and
the Scottish Enlightenment writers. Webster's basic premise, that power
follows property, was a recurrent theme in the civic-republican tradition.
Harrington had developed fully the connection between polity and property, and his theme was picked up by American civic republicans like
John Adams. Webster developed this premise along figurative lines that
echoed Adams's Dissertationon the Canon and the FeudalLaw.28 9 Like
286 N. Webster, supra note 237.
287 See T. Pangle, supra note 237, at 95 ("Perhaps no one captured the moral transforma-

tion that was afoot better than Noah Webster, in the remarkable essay he contributed to the
ratification debates .... ").
288 N. Webster, supra note 237, reprinted in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United

States 59-60 (P. Ford ed. 1888) (emphasis in original).
289 J. Adams, supra note 77.
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Adams, Webster used history to affirm the meaning of the new nation
and its regime of property. For Webster, as for Adams and others, feudal property was the mirror image of what we were to become. Webster's use of entailments and primogeniture was entirely symbolic, for by
this time those devices had been eliminated virtually everywhere. What
is notable is the seriousness with which Webster discussed the need to
abolish entail and primogeniture, suggesting that they continued to act as
powerful symbols long after any threat that the English society of landed
aristocracy would be recreated in America had dissipated. Webster,
doubtless fully aware of this, appreciated that their very irrelevance made
them all the more useful as symbols by which to discuss the form of
aristocracy that was taken seriously at this time. This was the form of
aristocracy that many Americans believed the Federalists were seeking to
create through the Constitution. Webster's basic objective in writing his
essay was to defend the Federalist social order, an order based on unrestrained commerce. His strategy was to develop a variation on the familiar theme of history as progressive, a variation that situated the
Federalist order at the opposite end of the spectrum from aristocracy.
Webster pointed out that there are two systems in which property
ownership and political power are distributed: hierarchical or democratic. Representing these two paths were on the one hand primogeniture and entailments, which signified aristocracy, and on the other hand
commerce, which represented freedom and democracy. By associating
freedom with commerce, Webster crucially shifted from the framework
of Harrington, Jefferson, and Adams to one whose roots lay in the Scottish Enlightenment tradition and whose development was the project of
Federalist writers.
Webster, on behalf of the Federalists, was claiming that commerce
and manufacturing had thrown the weight of property in favor of democracy and away from aristocracy. The understanding of liberty and freedom that operates barely beneath the surface here is not described solely
by its negative antiaristocracy, anti-English meaning but also includes an
association of liberty and freedom with private activity. Commerce instrumentally promotes freedom rather than jeopardizes it, as civic republicans thought, because the meaning of freedom shifted from the
Harringtonian notion of agricultural activity within and for the public
realm to commercial activity within and for one's own sphere. Individuals are free when they "revolve" land "from hand to hand, as time and
accident may direct." Webster here unmistakably affirms the dynamic
understanding of property. But the dynamic activity he depicted was
that of autonomous economic actors rather than civically connected citizens. Even less compatible with his social vision are the ideas of people
as socially interdependent and of market forces acting to alienate citizens
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from one another. Whereas earlier republican writing anticipated aspects of these modem ideas,2 9" they are absent entirely from Webster's
text.
The privatization of freedom and property constituted a repudiation
of the civic-republican ideology in one sense, but again it is important to
stress that the meaning of property that Webster was creating did carry
forward cultural beliefs that were fundamental to Jeffersonians. The repudiation of family dynasties based on property tied up through entailments and primogeniture, the endorsement of individual ownership of
limited amounts of land, even the depiction of "the laborious and the
saving" as the best citizens-a characterization that was congenial to
nonrepublicans like Hamilton-all were familiar Jeffersonian themes.
More importantly, Webster's objective was to create a meaning of property that integrated a vestige (but only as a "fragmented survival") 29 1 of
the old republican understanding of property as political and social with
the newer understanding of property as private. Property, rendered dynamic for private gain, was the path to realizing the vision of a democratic society.
That this integrated public/private meaning of property animated
Webster's essay becomes even clearer when we examine the rest of his
argument. He continued:
A general and tolerably equal distributionof landedproperty is the
whole basis of nationalfreedom: the system of the great Montesquieu
will ever be erroneous, till the wordsproperty or lands in fee simple are
substituted for virtue, throughout his Spirit of [the] Laws.
Virtue, patriotism, or love of country, never was and never will be,
till men's natures are changed, a fixed, permanent principle and support of government. But in an agricultural country, a general possession of land in fee simple, may be rendered perpetual, and the
inequalities introduced by commerce, are too fluctuating to endanger
government. An equality of property, with a necessity of alienation,
constantly operating to destroy combinations of powerful families, is
the very soul ofa republic-While this continues, the people will inevitably possess bothpower andfreedom; when this is lost, power departs,
liberty expires, and a commonwealth will inevitably assume some
292
other form.
Gordon Wood has interpreted Webster's writing during the mid-tolate-1780s as indicating a complete loss of faith in virtue as the foundation of the republic. 293 This loss of faith, Wood argues, contributed to
See text accompanying notes 48-68 supra.
The phrase is borrowed from A. MacIntyre, supra note 189, at 257.
N. Webster, supra note 237, reprinted in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United
States 59 (P. Ford ed. 1888) (emphasis in original).
293 See G. Wood, supra note 3, at 610.
290
291
292
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the demise of civil republicanism in American thought and signalled the
ascendence of liberalism. 294 J.G.A. Pocock rightly has responded that
Webster in the passage just quoted was in fact adopting the Harringtonian-and Jeffersonian-position that "a material foundation was
necessary to ensure virtue and equality" and that land owned in fee simple was such a foundation. 295 Webster here was resuming quite deliberately the Harringtonian tradition of identifying property of a particular
type and employing an overtly common-law vocabulary to prescribe
ownership of a particular kind as foundational for both equality and
freedom.
Appropriating the Jeffersonian critique of landed aristocracy was
strategically well-suited to Webster's purpose: to respond to the charge
that Federalist politics was hierarchical and would reinforce an American aristocracy that already had begun to take the place of the hated
English aristocracy. This is not to say that his endorsement of a relatively wide distribution of fee-simple ownership of land was disingenuous. Rather it is to insist that change accompanied continuity in the
Jeffersonian rhetoric of property among different practitioners of that
rhetoric. Jefferson and Webster wrote with different needs in mind: Jefferson, to find a path to maintaining a vestige of the civic-republican vision in a society moving toward commercialization and modernity;
Webster, to find some way to connect a political regime designed for modernity with the nation's premodern revolutionary culture.
One of the most noteworthy aspects of Webster's essay is his use of
the symbolic language of stability and dynamism that pervaded virtually
all of the civic-republican discourse about property. He continually
moves back and forth between stability and dynamism, in one sense continuing a dialectic with which civic republicans would have been familiar, but in a more profound sense shifting the meaning of the figurative
language of stasis and flux from that understood within the civic-republican system of signification. This process illustrates again how the ambiguity of that vocabulary permitted, indeed encouraged, innovation that
led to transformation.
Notice, first of all, how Webster juxtaposed stability and instability
in the following passage to minimize the threat that commerce posed to
republican government and republican ideals: "[I]n an agricultural
country, a general possession of land in fee simple, may be rendered perpetual, and the inequalities introduced by commerce, are too fluctuating
to endanger government. '296 Here, he is anxious to insist that stability
See id. at 606-15.
J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 4, at 534.
296 N. Webster, supra note 237, reprinted in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United
States 59 (P. Ford ed. 1888).
294
295
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not assume the public meaning of inequality. Stability can coexist with
equality through ownership of land in fee simple. But the crucial step
linking land ownership with stable equality, for Webster, was a dynamic
regime of ownership. 297 Land, because of its obvious physical immobility, is associated easily with stability, but, Webster subtly reminded his
American readers, the meaning of stability by itself is ambiguous. After
all, English social and political hierarchy rested on, to borrow the rhetoric of stability, a foundation of stable ownership of land. Linking stability of land ownership with equality requires the mutually reinforcing
measures of limiting, as much as possible, the estate in which land ownership exists to the fee simple and protecting the free and full alienability
of land. Together these two measures create a dynamic of land ownership. Webster here drew attention to a central paradox: dynamism is
necessary to achieve stability. Equality and freedom can be secured only
through a regime of land ownership based on a dynamic of alienation of
unencumbered property interests. It is the legal policy of alienability,
then, that Webster saw as the crucial mechanism by which property
would be the foundation for individual freedom and equality rather than
hierarchy and aristocracy.
Webster's emphasis on the importance of alienability of property indicates a shift toward a more privatized meaning of freedom and a more
formalized meaning of equality than those terms had within civic-republican discourse. Alienability of property expressed a vision of marketized
social relations, not a vision of property as the foundation for citizens to
participate in the creation of public life. It certainly did not express a
vision of equality in fact. The purpose of property was to enable people
to create their own lives and pursue their own conceptions of the good.
Freely transferable property was a metaphor for opportunity, not for entitlement. Removing restraints on the alienability of land gives people
access to property, through market transactions, but it does not assure
that all social distinctions will be eliminated. 298 It secures individual
See id.
John Adams unambiguously expressed this understanding of the relationship between
property and equality in a letter to his son, written a few years after Webster's essay, that
criticized Chancellor James Kent's contention that English law in particular was "utterly subversive of Equality of rights." Adams's response to the assertion is one with which Kent
would have found little to disagree:
I contend that the laws from our own Country, and every other Country where the
hereditary Descent of real estates is established, is as utterly subversive of Equality as
the Descent of the Whole of real estate to the first born, or of a Lordship in Parliament,
or of the Crown itself. All laws which establish Property are inconsistent with Equality
in one sense. The very idea of Property is inconsistent with Equality ....
It is the establishment of Property... which introduce[s] the great Inequalities in
fact, but no Inequalities of right.
Letter from John Adams to Charles Francis Adams (Feb. 15, 1795), reprinted in Memoirs and
297
298
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freedom in the sense that status and property formally are uncoupled.
The choice between feudal property and alienable property that
Webster posed indicates his understanding of individual freedom as formal and negative. Feudal property, which he described in terms of the
use of entailments and primogeniture to lock up land, locked individuals
within a formal hierarchy. Webster continually defined the freedom that
property would secure in the new order as the mirror image of the regime
of formal hierarchy based on privileged holdings of land. Stable freedom
and stable equality would exist by liberating land from all of the feudal
entanglements, leaving the "pure" form of ownership, the freely alienable
fee simple, as the dominant estate in land. It is the juxtaposition of feudal and alienable property as the only available alternatives that made it
intelligible for him to assert: "The power of entailing estates is more
dangerous to liberty and republican government, than all the constitutions that can be written on paper, or even than a standing army." 2 99
Webster's dichotomy between feudal and alienable land obviously
resembled the older and more familiar feudal-allodial dichotomy. 3°° The
surface resemblance should not obscure, though, an important change.
Webster's feudal-alienable dichotomy transformed the feudal-allodial
distinction because the term "allodial" had never emphasized alienability
expressly. Transferability, of course, was implicit in the idea of allodial
land, but it was not its defining characteristic. Allodial land had signified
a natural order which was perverted by an unnatural political regime
that made land the basis for domination of the many by the few. It also
had represented an indigenous order that had been suppressed by a foreign influence.
Alienability was not central to these civic messages. But it was central to the Federalist message. Federalists regarded the idea of the
human personality as civic to be dangerously wrong-headed. A strong
policy of alienability of property encouraged individual freedom by advancing a wedge between public and private life. There was no attempt
in Webster's discussion to connect the alienability policy with political
independence or self-governance. His understanding of individual liberty
was liberal and negative rather than positive and civic. He associated the
policy of alienability with the principle of freedom to alienate, and he
equated collective, or regulatory, restraints with the old feudal restraints.
Both forms of restraints were objectionable because they limited the
transferability of property. He never considered that this policy might
require sacrificing the principle of individual freedom to alienate.
Letters of James Kent 70-71 (W. Kent ed. 1898).
299 N. Webster, supra note 237, reprinted in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United

States 60 (P. Ford ed. 1888).
300

See text accompanying notes 156-78 supra.
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Rather, he saw them as mutually reinforcing.
In one sense it seems that Webster dissolved the dialectic of stability
and dynamism by discounting the demands of stability. This interpretation, however, misses a crucial shift in the meaning of stability in Webster's essay. To see this shift, one needs to distinguish between two
conceptions of stability of property operating in political and legal discourse during the eighteenth century. The first is republican stability,
and it can be traced to Harrington. According to this conception, stability of property means that land not be used as an exchange commodity
but remain in the possession of the freeholder. The only mode of transfer
that was expected was inheritance. Stability performed a civil functionanchoring citizens so that they were free to be public-regarding rather
than self-interested.
The second conception is utilitarian, developed by Hume and later
refined by Bentham. Like Harrington, Hume associated stability with
possession, but to a quite different end. Hume emphasized stability of
one's possessions as "the most necessary to the establishment of human
society." 3'0 Stability of possessions (which Hume did not confine to
land) served a social rather than civic function-maintaining society by
avoiding constant disorder and violence. Unlike Harrington, Hume assumed that individuals had limited capacity to act in the public interest
and that individual selfishness made justice and property necessary. 3°2
Moreover, unlike Harrington, who contemplated stability of possession
after the government had redistributed land to maintain a "balance" of
property, Hume assigned no redistributive role to the government. The
government's function was only to secure one's rights as an owner, but
not to participate in a plan of distributing those possessions. The injunction of stability, Hume considered, was to "leave every one in the peacea'
ble enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and industry. "303
Finally, Hume departed from the Harringtonian conception in maintaining that a crucial aspect of security of ownership is that individual owners be free to transfer their property as they wish. For Hume, then,
stability of property includes the idea that possessions can be used as
3°4
exchange commodities.
301 D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 491 (L. Selby-Bigge ed. 2d ed. 1978) (London

1739).
302 See id. at 494-97.

303 Id. at 489. Bentham later expressed the same conception of stability of property in
terms of "security," which he said was "the most important object" of legislation. Bentham,
The Theory of Legislation, in Principles of the Civil Code 98 (C. Ogden ed. 1931). "As regards property," Bentham wrote, "security consists in receiving no check, no shock, no derangement to the expectation founded on the laws, of enjoying such and such a portion of
good." Id. at 113.
304 See D. Hume, supra note 301, at 514-16; Bentham, supra note 303, at 112.
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Webster's discussion of property did not abandon the stability part
of the republican dialectic so much as it took advantage of the ambiguous
meaning of stability. It combined elements of the utilitarian and republican conceptions, abandoning the republican understanding to the extent
that property would not be stable in the sense that it would be immobile 30 5 or that it would embed citizens in the ground of politics, preventing them from being transplanted into the ard and shifting sands of
commerce. However, it continued the republican understanding to the
extent that it recognized that property has a political, democraticizing
role. This is evident in Webster's use of the Harringtonian formula that
power follows property, leading him, like Harrington, to emphasize the
need for "a general and tolerably equal distribution of landed property. 3 0° 6 For Webster, as for Harrington, it is the stability of power that
is ultimately important. Harrington sought a stability of property because he considered that such a property regime was necessary to achieve
a stable and equal distribution of political power among the citizenry.
Webster continued the republican emphasis on the distribution of political power.
What Webster changed was the strategy for securing stability and
equality of power. In effect, he turned the Harringtonian critique of mobile property on its head. First, he adopted the utilitarian theme of security of individual ownership interests. Then, rather than achieving
equality of political power through government controls that initially distribute land in fee simple equally among all citizens and thereafter maintain equality against the forces of commerce, Webster relied on
commerce as the very force that would create and maintain an equality
of property and power. Eliminating the old aristocratic restraints on
alienation and making property freely transferable, Webster argued, itself
30 7
would create equality, as each citizen would have access to property.
Stability of property, according to Webster, means that wealth would
305 The Harringtonian conception of stable property was aided by a common misunderstanding of what it means for property, especially land, to be immobile. The natural fact that
land itself cannot be moved and personal property, including intangibles evidenced by legal
paper can be, made the idea of immobile property, where property is equated with land, easy to
understand. But this confuses the ownership interest in some object of property with the object itself. Land cannot be mobile, but ownership interests in it certainly can be. It is the
mobility of ownership interests, rather than the object of those interests, that is relevant.
306 N. Webster, supra note 237, reprinted in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United
States 59 (P. Ford ed. 1888).
307 This argument departs from classical utilitarianism to the extent that it attempts to
make equality and security mutually reinforcing. Bentham made no such pretense. Rather, he
argued that security must be given priority over equality because without individual security
equality cannot be maintained. See Bentham, supra note 303, at 119-22. He did, however,
contend that security indirectly aids equality and that prosperity in time progresses toward
equality. See id. at 122-23.
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remain distributed among the citizenry in a rough equality, rather than
becoming concentrated in the hands of a few families.
Webster's discussion continued republican aspects of the stability of
property in one final sense. The path to liberation, from the past and
from what he and other American writers associated with it, lay in stability of property. Webster connected America's historical uniqueness with
the theme of stable property in this passage:
The English writers on law and government consider Magna Charta,
trial by juries, the Habeas Corpus act, and the liberty of the press, as
the bulwarks of freedom. All this is well. But in no government of
consequence in Europe, is freedom established on its true and immoveable foundation. The property is too much accumulated, and the accumulations too well-guarded, to admit the true principleof republics....
But in America, and here alone, we have gone at once to the fountain
of liberty, and raised the people to their true dignity. Let the lands be
possessed by the people in fee simple, let the fountains be kept pure,
and the streams will be pure of course.... All other [free] nations
have wrested property and freedom from barons and tyrants; we begin
our empire with full possession of property and all its attending
rights.

3 08

The vision that Webster articulated in the passage was the liberal
conception of ownership as consolidated control in individual hands.
That conception, of course, was not new. Blackstone had articulated it
in his widely known definition of common-law ownership as "that sole
and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
' '3 9
individual in the universe. 0
It is no coincidence that Webster would articulate this conception in
a metaphorical vocabulary that Blackstone's definition lacked. Fee-simple ownership was expressed more readily as the "pure" fountain in the
eighteenth-century American context of vast wilderness and, equally important, a widely shared self-image of historical uniqueness. Webster
and most American lawyers understood that the Blackstonian conception of ownership was a myth in the context of English society. Indeed,
they considered that ownership based on individual autonomy and equality had not in fact existed anywhere in history. The common law, in
developing the concept of the fee-simple absolute, had articulated that
ideal, but had not actually implemented the common-law ideal. Because
the common-law conception of ownership as the fee-simple absolute had
not existed anywhere previously, it had not fulfilled its promise of indi308 N. Webster, supra note 237, reprinted in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United
States 60-61 (P. Ford ed. 1888) (emphasis in original).
309 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *2.
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vidual liberation.
A continuation of the theme of millennialism appears in Webster's
pronouncement that the true meaning of property has at last been realized. In America, for the first time in history, the ideal is made reality.
In tone, if not in all substantive respects, Webster's essay resembles John
Adams's earlier Dissertationon the Canon and the Feudal Law310 and
even his later Defence of the Constitutions of the United States of
America.31 1 Like Adams's essays, indeed like most eighteenth-century
American political writing,31 2 Webster's writings articulated the sacred
history of the New World, a teleology whose culmination is marked by
the founding of the American republic. Moreover, Webster, like many
other American lawyers at the time, defined that teleology within the
framework of property. Webster was announcing the arrival of the feesimple empire. But, departing from Adams's millennialist vision, Webster not only completely secularized the millennium, dropping all biblical
allusions, but also depicted it as occurring within the dynamic of individual economic activity. The fee-simple empire no longer was described as
an empire of citizen-farmers; to Webster, it had become an empire of
landowners who use land as the subject matter of economic transactions.
CONCLUSION

Webster's essay exemplifies the paradox of ideological change occurring through continuity. He continued to define the meaning of property
in figural language and extended virtually all of the important figurative
devices from civic-republican discourse, including the juxtaposition of
property with time, and the dichotomy of forms of property and their
correspondence with two historical visions of social order, one hierarchical and oppressive, the other democratic and liberating. But in using
individual ownership of property as the basis for his attempt to defend
the federalist program against the charge of creating a new aristocratic
social order, he shifted the meaning of the civic-republican vocabulary in
crucial respects, helping to create cultural language of what has been
called "commercial republicanism.1 31 3 Most importantly, the thrust of
310 Adams, supra note 77.
311 J.Adams, supra note 266. The Defence of the Constitutions of the United States of
America is quite consistent with Adams's own earlier work in its assertion that the "Promise"
was realized in the American republic.
At the same time, as Gordon Wood rightly points out, the Defence of the Constitutions of
the United States of America was a work riddled with contradiction. Adams's affirmations of
America's uniqueness were juxtaposed with characterizations of American society as aristocratic. See G. Wood, supra note 3, at 580-87.
312 On the millennialist theme in American writing, see S. Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad (1978); E. Tuveson, supra note 194.
313 See, e.g., D. McCoy, supra note 206, at 101.
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his argument for individual ownership of freely alienable property as the
only stable foundation for individual freedom was to locate property in
the realm of individual economic activity. The concomitant effect of this
identification of individual liberation from domination and hierarchy
with alienable property was to establish more clearly individual activity
with the unrestrained market as the dominant metaphor by which American lawyers understood the central meaning of property and its relationship to the political ideal of individual freedom. The public and private
dimensions of property had become more distinct from each other than
they had been in civic-republican discourse. The dialectic had not ended;
it had only shifted.
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